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I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court had cause to give
elaborate consideration to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution. Near the end of his dissent from the Court’s judgment,
Justice Clarence Thomas made a remarkable observation: “Regrettably,
today’s opinion breathes new life into that Clause.”1 Regrettably? In
what sense can a member of the Court regret the fact that the Court has
declined to treat a provision of the fundamental law as a dead letter?
One might think that making the Constitution’s provisions effective was
part of the job description. To be sure, Justice Thomas quoted as support
for his lament a line from the opinion of the Court in Printz v. United
States in which Justice Antonin Scalia referred to the clause as “the last,
best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action,”2 but that
reminder of Justice Scalia’s scornful dismissal of the final provision of
Article I, Section 8 only deepens the mystery. Justice Holmes long ago
wrote something similar about the Equal Protection Clause—it was, he
thought, “the usual last resort of constitutional arguments”3—but in
hindsight, that opinion was not his finest hour, and the Equal Protection
Clause has gone on to enjoy a most lively judicial existence. Why then
this disdain for the Necessary and Proper Clause? Even if it is true,
descriptively, that litigants with insubstantial claims often turn to a
particular provision of the Constitution, that fact neither evacuates the
provision of substantial meaning nor excuses the Justices from taking it
seriously.
Justice Thomas, however, was not alone in suggesting uncertainty about
what to make of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The opinions filed in
Comstock supporting the Court’s judgment are not dismissive about
arguments over the clause’s application, but they show neither simplicity
1. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1983 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Seven Justices agreed with the Court’s judgment, although Justices Kennedy and Alito
filed separate opinions and did not join in Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court. Justice
Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s dissent except for one subsection.
2. Id. (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997)).
3. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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nor clarity in how to bring the clause to bear on the straightforward
question of constitutional law before the Court. The Justices’ collective
uncertainty was not, however, mere coincidence. In this Article, I argue
that in Comstock, the Court encountered one of the oldest and most basic
constitutional issues about the scope of congressional power—whether
there are justiciable limits to the range of legitimate ends Congress may
pursue. The Justices, without fully recognizing the fact, were taking sides
in an ancient debate, and in doing so, they inadvertently reopened an
issue that ought to be deemed long settled.
Part II of the Article first addresses the question before the Court in
Comstock, which was limited to a pure question of Article I law: is a
specific provision of a particular act of Congress, 18 U.S.C. § 4248, a
legitimate exercise of implied congressional power under the Necessary
and Proper Clause? I then present what I call the “obvious answer” to
the question presented—§ 4248 is within Congress’s powers—and the
equally obvious rationale—the provision addresses the social problem
posed by the potential release of sexually dangerous prisoners from
federal custody on the basis of Congress’s judgment that doing so is an
appropriate part of the overall federal system of incarceration, which
itself is a necessary concomitant to the existence of federal criminal
laws. I argue that my rationale is correct in principle and as an application
of McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court’s iconic Necessary and Proper Clause
decision.4 In Part III, I discuss the four opinions filed in Comstock, none
of which was willing to adopt my “obvious” rationale although seven
Justices agreed with the outcome and all four opinions claimed to follow
McCulloch. All four opinions are plagued with problems, and despite the
disagreements between them, the opinions adopt unclear or unnecessarily
complex approaches to addressing the issue before the Court.
Part IV presents an interpretation of the Comstock opinions as
presenting, most clearly in Justice Thomas’s dissent but obliquely in the
other opinions, a Jeffersonian reading of McCulloch. The Comstock
Justices’ convoluted wrestling with the issue of implied congressional
power echoes the suggestion in McCulloch that the Court is under a duty
to strike down federal laws that rest on a pretextual use of Congress’s
enumerated powers, an idea that depends in turn on the argument
advanced by Jefferson and Madison that Congress’s purposes in exercising
any of its powers are limited to those defined by the terms of Article I’s
4.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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specifications of legislative power.5 I go on to argue that in doing so, the
Comstock Justices have reopened the old debate between the Jeffersonians
and their nationalist foes over the scope of Congress’s legitimate ends.
In Part V, I turn to evaluate Comstock’s revival of Jeffersonian
constitutional thought and conclude that in that important respect, the
Court has made a serious mistake. The nationalist view, that Congress
has the constitutional authority to address any legitimate object of
legislative concern even though the tools by which it does so are limited,
is correct as a matter of law. My argument for that conclusion is that it
is right in constitutional principle and makes better sense of the history
of political practice, the Supreme Court’s case law, including McCulloch,
and the specific role of judicial review in the constitutional system. It is
the Court’s reluctant, half-uncomprehending stance toward Congress’s
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause, not the majority’s correct
decision that the clause authorizes § 4248, that is truly regrettable.
II. THE NARROW QUESTION IN COMSTOCK AND ITS
OBVIOUS ANSWER
A. Defining the Issue Before the Court
The question before the Court in Comstock concerned the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 4248, enacted as part of the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. Justice Stephen Breyer
for the Court described § 4248 as a “federal civil-commitment statute
authoriz[ing] the Department of Justice to detain a mentally ill, sexually
dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise
be released.”6 Under § 4248, the federal government may institute
proceedings in district court against any individual in the custody
of the Bureau of Prisons who is believed to be a “sexually dangerous
person”—someone who
(1) has previously “engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct
or child molestation,” (2) currently “suffers from a serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder,” and (3) “as a result of” that mental illness, abnormality,
or disorder is “sexually dangerous to others,” in that “he would have serious
difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if
released.”7

5. See Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for
Establishing a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF
POWER: A SOURCEBOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 41, 41–42
(1991) [hereinafter LANGUAGES OF POWER]; James Madison, Speech in the U.S. House
of Representatives (Feb. 2, 1791), in LANGUAGES OF POWER, supra, at 37, 37–38.
6. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1954 (majority opinion).
7. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5)–(6) (2006)).
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If the government proves these assertions by clear and convincing
evidence, the district court is required to order continued detention while
the Department of Justice attempts to persuade officials of the state in
which the individual was tried or is currently detained to accept
responsibility for the detainee.
If, notwithstanding such efforts, neither such State will assume such responsibility,
the Attorney General shall place the person for treatment in a suitable facility,
until (1) such a State will assume such responsibility; or (2) the person’s
condition is such that he is no longer sexually dangerous to others, or will not be
sexually dangerous to others if released under a prescribed regimen of medical,
psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment; whichever is earlier.8

Although the statute requires “ongoing psychiatric and judicial review of
the individual’s case, including judicial hearings at the request of the
confined person at six-month intervals,” the district court may order the
individual’s discharge from custody, with or without conditions, only if
the party seeking discharge proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the individual is no longer sexually dangerous.9 Section 4248 thus
allows for the indefinite, potentially lifelong detention in federal hospital
facilities of persons who have served their federal prison sentences or
have not in fact been convicted of any federal crime.
Comstock consolidated § 4248 proceedings the federal government
brought in district court in North Carolina against five individuals. Four
had pleaded guilty to federal offenses involving child pornography or
sexual abuse of a minor, and the government invoked § 4248 when
“each of them . . . was about to be released from federal prison”; the fifth
defendant “had been charged in federal court with aggravated sexual
abuse of a minor, but was found mentally incompetent to stand trial.”10
All five moved to dismiss the proceeding on various constitutional
grounds, and the district court agreed, concluding that due process
requires that the government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt
and that, in any event, Congress lacks the power under Article I to enact
§ 4248.11 The Fourth Circuit affirmed on the Article I ground and
declined to reach the due process issue.12 The Supreme Court granted

8. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006).
9. Id. § 4248(d)–(e); Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1955.
10. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1955.
11. United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 559–60 (E.D.N.C. 2007),
aff’d, 551 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1949.
12. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 276.
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the government’s petition for certiorari in Comstock, which framed the
issue before the Court as “[w]hether Congress had the constitutional
authority to enact 18 U.S.C. [§] 4248.”13 Although the Comstock
defendants asked the Court to rule on their due process claim as well if it
agreed to review the case, the Court declined.14 Subsequent to the
Court’s order granting certiorari, two courts of appeals upheld § 4248
against the Article I challenge.15
How should the Court have addressed the issue it agreed to review in
Comstock? The Court only agreed to address the scope of Congress’s
affirmative power to enact § 4248.16 There are serious arguments that
§ 4248 is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause or perhaps with other
constitutional guarantees of individual liberty: the perhaps endless
detention of American citizens for reasons other than criminal conviction
raises very real constitutional concerns, but these were simply not before
the Court. Justice Breyer for the Court was at pains to remind the reader
that the Comstock decision did not address and does not foreclose those
arguments.17 The Court’s business in Comstock, in short, was limited to
resolving a question about the scope of Article I. No other constitutional
concern was before the Court.
I should note one other feature of the question presented in Comstock.
As their case was argued to the Supreme Court, the defendants in
Comstock did not contest Congress’s authority to enact the criminal
statutes under which they were convicted or, in one instance, charged.
In other words, the defendants in Comstock conceded, by implication,
that the criminal statutes under which they came into federal custody
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (No. 08-1224).
14. The defendants argued against review but asked that the Court address their
claim that “the Due Process Clause mandates the reasonable doubt standard for the
factual determination required” by § 4248 in the interests of “judicial economy.” Brief
in Opposition at i, 17, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (No. 08-1224).
15. See United States v. Volungus, 595 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v.
Tom, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009).
16. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1954 (“Here we ask whether the Federal
Government has the authority under Article I of the Constitution to enact this federal
civil-commitment program.”).
17. See id. (“We have previously examined similar statutes enacted under state law
to determine whether they violate the Due Process Clause. But this case presents a
different question.” (citations omitted)); id. at 1956 (“[W]e assume, but we do not
decide, that other provisions of the Constitution—such as the Due Process Clause—do
not prohibit civil commitment in these circumstances.”); id. at 1957 (“[T]he present
statute’s validity under provisions of the Constitution other than the Necessary and
Proper Clause is an issue that is not before us.”); id. at 1965 (“We do not reach or decide
any claim that the statute or its application denies equal protection of the laws,
procedural or substantive due process, or any other rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Respondents are free to pursue those claims on remand, and any others they have
preserved.”). The hint seems fairly clear, and federal lawyers litigating individual liberty
attacks on § 4248 may be in for a rough ride.
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were constitutional but argued that even so, they could not be subject to
involuntary commitment under § 4248. Granting arguendo that Congress
had the constitutional authority to authorize their arrest, detention, trial,
and imprisonment or other punishment, the Comstock defendants insisted
that Congress lacked the authority to keep them in nonpunitive, remedial
custody based on the showing of mental illness and sexual dangerousness
required by § 4248. The extensive exercise of federal government
jurisdiction over each could not constitutionally extend, they maintained,
to that particular outcome.
B. The Obvious Answer and Its Equally Obvious Rationale
Comstock thus presented the Court with a narrow and specific
question. The Court’s answer could have been equally cut and dried:
§ 4248 is within the scope of Congress’s Article I powers. As we have
seen, it was assumed that the Constitution delegates to Congress the
authority to enact the criminal statutes pursuant to which the five
defendants were charged.18 Because the Constitution expressly authorizes
Congress to enact criminal statutes in only a few instances, none relevant
in Comstock,19 we are already in the realm of implied rather than express
powers, but that is of no constitutional moment. The enactment of criminal
statutes, and the accompanying creation of the federal governmental

18. See United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 526 n.2 (E.D.N.C. 2007)
(discussing charges against the individual defendants). The child pornography statutes
involved in Comstock all define the prohibited behavior with reference to “interstate or
foreign commerce.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2006 & Supp. III
2009). They are clearly exercises of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and
there seems little doubt that they are in fact constitutional. The federal sexual assault
provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2242 (2006), apply to actions “in the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, or [other federally
supervised facilities],” circumstances in which it is generally conceded that Congress
may exercise plenary legislative jurisdiction parallel to that possessed by the state
legislatures. See, e.g., Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1978 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(stating that federal civil commitment proceedings might be valid for persons “who enter
federal custody as a result of acts committed” in areas where the Constitution “grants
Congress plenary authority”). In any case, it was the working assumption in Comstock
that the underlying criminal statutes are valid.
19. “[T]he Constitution . . . nowhere speaks explicitly about the creation of federal
crimes beyond those related to ‘counterfeiting,’ ‘treason,’ or ‘Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas’ or ‘against the Law of Nations.’” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at
1957 (majority opinion). The sexual assault statutes include acts “on the high Seas” but
are not limited to that circumstance and could not be generally sustained under the clause
of Article I, Section 8 addressing it.
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apparatus necessary to criminal prosecution and punishment as a means
to the execution of express powers, are steps beyond the enumerated
powers initially taken by the First Congress. The Supreme Court has
never questioned their validity. In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall
wrote that “[a]ll admit that the government may, legitimately, punish any
violation of its laws.”20 Because Congress may enact criminal laws as
part of its exercise of its regulatory powers over, for example,
interstate commerce,21 no one has ever doubted that it may also provide
for the confinement of persons convicted of violating those laws.
Because Congress may create a prison system in order to carry out its
design of imprisoning those who violate its criminal laws, under
McCulloch it must also have the power to fill out the details of that
system in a manner that is “conducive to the complete accomplishment
of the object” of the prison system.22 Prisoners need food, clothing, and
care when they are sick, and no one has ever doubted that Congress may
provide for these necessities while those convicted are prisoners. With
respect to prisoners who are serving a term of years, their ultimate
discharge is one of the outcomes of the prison system that Congress
necessarily has in view, and the conclusion that Congress has no power
to address the conditions of that discharge is patently unreasonable. Are
prisoners with no clothes of their own to be released naked, prisoners
confined on an island required to swim to shore, impoverished prisoners
on daily medication sent on their way with no medicine or means of
obtaining it? Section 4248 is simply one of the means that Congress has
adopted because it is “conducive to the complete accomplishment of the
object” of creating a prison system that addresses in a global and
sensible manner the congressional program of imprisoning those who
violate its laws.
There is no mystery about the source of Congress’s authority to do
any of this: throughout this entire course of legislation, the constitutional
end in sight has been “the beneficial exercise of those powers” that
authorize the substantive criminal statutes under which defendants are
charged with violating federal criminal statutes.23 With respect to
someone convicted of violating a law penalizing the receipt of child
pornography that has moved in “interstate or foreign commerce,”24 for
example, § 4248 carries into execution the interstate and foreign commerce
20. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416 (1819).
21. In fact, the Commerce Clause is the primary constitutional basis of federal
criminal law. See Robin Morse, Federalism Challenges to the Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 1753, 1769 (2009).
22. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424.
23. Id. at 409.
24. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
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powers delegated to Congress by Article I, Section 8, Clause 3. So do
all of the other statutory provisions that create the federal prison system
and regulate its dealings with federal prisoners when they bear on that
individual: in the prisoner’s case, the whole of the system is the means
Congress has chosen to carry out its goal of punishing the use of the
channels of commerce to obtain child pornography, and to do so in what
Congress considers to be a fashion beneficial to the public interest.
Section 4248, like all the other provisions creating and regulating the
federal prison system, is “plainly adapted”25 to the end of regulating
“Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States”26 for
exactly the same reason that the criminal law prohibitions themselves are
“plainly adapted” to that end: Congress has made the decision to use
imprisonment in a comprehensive federal prison system as the means of
enforcing its regulatory decision to close interstate and foreign commerce to
child pornography. The same reasoning is equally apposite when § 4248
is applied to persons charged with federal crimes predicated on other
powers of Congress. In each instance Congress’s purpose is the “beneficial
exercise” of the underlying power, “the complete accomplishment of the
object” of enforcing its laws through a criminal justice system involving
imprisonment.
The Comstock defendants pointed out to the Court that § 4248
addresses issues of mental illness and public safety about which the
states ordinarily have responsibility,27 but that observation raises no
substantial question about the constitutional purpose or object of the
provision. It has long been settled that “Congress, as an incident to [an
enumerated power], may adopt not only means necessary but convenient
to its exercise, and the means may have the quality of police
regulations.”28 If Congress enacted a sexual dangerousness statute
permitting the federal executive to bring involuntary commitment
proceedings because of sexual dangerousness against anyone in the
United States simply on the basis of the individual’s presence in the
country, such an act would have as its apparent object matters over
which Congress has no direct authority: by hypothesis it would have no
end rooted in any enumerated power and would therefore be beyond the
powers delegated by Article I. In contrast, § 4248 comes into play only
25.
26.
27.
28.

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1962–63 (2010).
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913).
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when someone is within federal criminal jurisdiction on the basis of a
federal criminal law executing some enumerated power: in operation the
section is always exercised incident to some enumerated power, like the
rest of the statutory law creating the federal penal system. Its
resemblance to the states’ “police regulations” is as constitutionally
irrelevant as the existence of state banks’ providing parallel services was
to the validity of the national bank in McCulloch.29
Chief Justice John Marshall thought this line of constitutional analysis
quite clear as a matter of “general reasoning”30:
The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty
of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to
select the means; and those who contend that it may not select any appropriate
means, that one particular mode of effecting the object is excepted, take upon
themselves the burden of establishing that exception.31

Congress has the power—“right” in that sense—to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce and perhaps a political and moral duty to do so
when there is or ought to be public concern over an issue falling within
its scope—such as the dissemination of child pornography through the
channels of commerce. That Congress has chosen a means, a comprehensive
federal prison system, that in the abstract can be broken down into
numerous individual exercises of legislative power requiring the use of a
“vast mass of incidental powers”32 not themselves regulations of commerce
is constitutionally immaterial. The same could be said, and was said, of
the National Bank Act that the Marshall Court upheld in McCulloch. As
Chief Justice Marshall’s colleague William Johnson explained a few
years later, McCulloch rested on “[t]he principle . . . that the grant of the
principal power carries with it the grant of all adequate and appropriate
means of executing it [and] the selection of those means must rest with
the general government.”33
Modern Justices appear less comfortable than the Marshall Court
Justices were with overtly deciding constitutional issues “according to the
dictates of reason,” 34 and all of the Comstock Justices treated the
constitutionality of § 4248 as entirely dependent on the correct
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.35 There too, however,
the reasoning in McCulloch validates the straightforward constitutional
29. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424.
30. Id. at 411.
31. Id. at 409–10.
32. Id. at 421.
33. William Johnson, Letter to James Monroe (June 1822), in LANGUAGES
POWER, supra note 5, at 324, 325.
34. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409.
35. See infra Part III.
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justification for § 4248 that I have just outlined. The clause, Chief Justice
Marshall explained, in no way modifies the conclusion dictated by reason
that Congress may “exercise its best judgment in the selection of
measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the
government.”36 The clause’s legal effect is simply to make the conclusion
express: “[T]he constitution of the United States has not left the right of
Congress to employ the necessary means, for the execution of the
powers conferred on the government, to general reasoning” because
“[t]o its enumeration of powers is added that of making ‘all laws which
shall be necessary and proper.’”37 Necessary in the clause does not mean
“absolutely necessary,” as the bank’s opponents had argued, but must be
read to “leave it in the power of congress to adopt any [means] which
might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end” of all of
Article I’s grants of power, which is the “beneficial execution” of
Congress’s enumerated powers.38 It is for Congress, not the Court, to
determine whether the means Congress adopts are sufficiently conducive
to the beneficial execution of its powers to justify their adoption: “[T]he
degree of its necessity, as has been very justly observed, is to be
discussed in another place.”39
Under the McCulloch Court’s interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, Comstock is an easy case. Section 4248 is conducive to
the end of enforcing Congress’s criminal law regulations of commerce
and all its other criminal law executions of its enumerated powers, and
for that reason it is, in the clause’s terms, a “Law[] which [is]
necessary . . . for carrying into Execution [those] Powers.”40 Perfectly
legitimate is debate over whether involving the federal government in
addressing the problems raised by the discharge of sexually dangerous
prisoners is valuable enough to the beneficial execution of Congress’s
36. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 420.
37. Id. at 411–12.
38. Id. at 413–15.
39. Id. at 423. Perhaps fearing that readers in our more literalistic era might miss
the elegant indirection of McCulloch’s reference to Congress as “another place,” Justice
Breyer quoted a 1934 opinion spelling out the point:
If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the end,
the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the
closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be
attained, are matters for congressional determination alone.
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010) (quoting Burroughs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 534, 547–48 (1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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powers to warrant congressional legislation, but it is debate that belongs
in the “other place” of the legislative process, not in the courts: “[T]o
undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to
pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread
on legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a
power.”41 The argument that “I think we are too far afield from the
purposes of having federal criminal laws to warrant this additional
wrinkle in the prison system” is a fine argument in the Senate, perhaps
even a constitutional one, but under McCulloch it ought to be a
nonstarter in a brief submitted to a court.
But wait a minute, the sharp-eyed reader is exclaiming about now,
what about the strategic ellipsis in the last paragraph’s quotation of the
clause? It is, after all, the Necessary and Proper Clause we are expounding,
and laws passed pursuant to it have to meet the requirements inherent in
each adjective. Furthermore, one might argue, Chief Justice Marshall
clearly acknowledged that proposition in McCulloch, where he stated
that the clause authorizes Congress to use not just any means that are
“conducive” to the execution of enumerated powers but those means that
“are appropriate.”42 The observation is correct but changes nothing, for
there is no argument in Comstock that § 4248 is not appropriate in Chief
Justice Marshall’s sense. To the extent that Chief Justice Marshall had
in mind Congress’s obligation to avoid transgressing express constitutional
prohibitions, the reader will recall that Comstock did not address whether
§ 4248 runs afoul of any such prohibition. In fact, however, Chief
Justice Marshall may well have had no justiciable legal issue in mind at
all in his references to “appropriate” legislation. In the discussion that
culminates with his disavowal of any judicial power to second-guess
Congress’s decision about the national bank’s necessity, Chief Justice
Marshall treated appropriate as one of a series of words describing the
bank’s value as a matter of national policy.43 The Necessary and Proper
Clause authorizes Congress to enact only those laws that are appropriate

41. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
42. Id. at 415 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion used the
actual words and proper in the constitutional text curiously, if not very convincingly, to
support his general thesis that necessary does not mean absolutely necessary. See id. at
418–19 (arguing that “the only possible effect” of adding and proper was “to present to
the mind the idea of some choice of means of legislation not straitened and compressed
within . . . narrow limits”). It is very likely that Chief Justice Marshall viewed necessary
and proper as a pleonasm with the second adjective proper importing no additional,
legally significant, or justiciable meaning.
43. Id. at 422–23 (discussing whether a bank is “an appropriate mode of executing
the powers of government” in terms of the consensus that “it is a convenient, a useful,
and essential instrument” and referring as well to “its importance and necessity” and “the
utility of this measure”).
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in the same way that Article I, Section 8 as a whole authorizes it to enact
only those laws that serve the general welfare: the observation is true
and important, but it is an essentially political principle rather than a
legal rule.
The most famous passage from McCulloch, which both the Court and
the dissent quote in Comstock,44 can serve nicely to restate, and provide
precedent for, the argument that I maintain establishes § 4248’s
constitutionality:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.45

“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution.”
The constitutional end for which Congress enacted § 4248 is, with
respect to each Comstock defendant, the enumerated power that
authorizes enactment of the criminal law prohibition under which he was
charged—the interstate and foreign commerce clauses, for example, in
the case of those defendants convicted under the child pornography
statutes. Someone charged under a federal criminal statute that is not
itself valid under some enumerated power could not be subject to the
§ 4248 process even if the person met the section’s criteria for
commitment because as to such a person, Congress’s end would not be
within the scope of the Constitution.46 In Comstock, however, as the
reader will recall, the constitutionality of the underlying criminal statutes
was a working assumption of the case before the Court. “[A]ll means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end.” As we
have seen, § 4248 is appropriate in the McCulloch sense because it is
obvious why Congress could consider it a means to making the most
“beneficial” use of its power to enforce its enumerated regulatory
powers, and as we have also seen, that is all that McCulloch requires to
establish—that the exercise of an implied power is an appropriate means

44. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956; id. at 1971 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
45. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
46. The set of possible defendants in a § 4248 proceeding charged under an invalid
federal criminal law is not empty: Imagine someone charged under an invalid act of
Congress and involuntarily committed because the person was incompetent to stand trial,
all before the Supreme Court struck down the act. Congress would lack the authority to
subject that person to § 4248 because under those circumstances, the provision would not
be a means of carrying into execution a valid exercise of an enumerated power.
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of executing an enumerated one. “[W]hich are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”
The Court, of course, did not address any of the arguments that § 4248
violates a constitutional prohibition, so this final McCulloch criterion
was not in issue.47 On the sole question before the Court in Comstock,
McCulloch confirms the validity of § 4248.
Comstock, then, ought to have been an easy case, decided unanimously
and announced in a short opinion pointing out the obvious line of
justification running from the express powers enumerated in Article I
that Congress enforces by criminal laws to the federal prison system of
which § 4248 is a small part. McCulloch and its interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause provide all the judicial authority necessary
to support the argument. No one on the Court clearly recognized this,
although two of the Justices who filed opinions in Comstock came close.
Summarizing what he thought common ground with the dissent on the
scope of Congress’s authority, Justice Breyer wrote:
Congress has the implied power to criminalize any conduct that might interfere
with the exercise of an enumerated power, and also the additional power to
imprison people who violate those (inferentially authorized) laws, and the
additional power to provide for the safe and reasonable management of those
prisons, and the additional power to regulate the prisoners’ behavior even after
their release.48

Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion concurring in the Comstock judgment
contained a rather similar passage:
[Section] 4248 . . . is a necessary and proper means of carrying into execution
the enumerated powers that support the federal criminal statutes under which
the affected prisoners were convicted. The Necessary and Proper Clause
provides the constitutional authority for most federal criminal statutes. In other
words, most federal criminal statutes rest upon a congressional judgment that, in
order to execute one or more of the powers conferred on Congress, it is
necessary and proper to criminalize certain conduct, and in order to do that it is
obviously necessary and proper to provide for the operation of a federal
criminal justice system and a federal prison system.
All of this has been recognized since the beginning of our country. . . .
....

47. There is no reasonable doubt that the first four clauses of the passage represent
two criteria—respectively concerning the end of a law and its propriety as a means—
each of which is expressed in two substantively synonymous phrases. One would expect
the final two clauses, each of which addresses the possibility that the law will violate
some prohibition in the Constitution, similarly to be parallel ways of expressing the same
substance. In Chief Justice Marshall’s eighteenth-century English, the verb to consist
could mean “not to contradict,” which further supports the conclusion that consist with
the letter and spirit restates are not prohibited in different words. See SAMUEL JOHNSON,
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Arno Press 1979) (1755) (defining to consist
as meaning “[t]o agree . . . not to contradict”).
48. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964 (majority opinion).
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. . . [And it is therefore] also necessary and proper for Congress to protect the
public from dangers created by the federal criminal justice and prison
systems.49

Both of these paragraphs are admirable for their cogency and concision;
either would have served well as the core of the analysis in a
straightforward opinion explaining the Court’s judgment in Comstock.
Regrettably, neither Justice Breyer nor Justice Alito nor any of their
colleagues felt able to deal with the Necessary and Proper Clause issue
in Comstock so simply.
III. FOUR ROADS TO CONSTITUTIONAL CONFUSION: THE
OPINIONS IN COMSTOCK
A. Complexity out of Simplicity: Justice Breyer’s
Opinion for the Court
From the beginning of his constitutional analysis, Justice Breyer made
it clear that in the Court’s view, resolving the question of § 4248’s
constitutionality required a complicated weighing of distinct factors
rather than the simple analytic framework I have argued is sufficient:
“[W]e conclude that the Constitution grants Congress legislative power
sufficient to enact § 4248. . . . base[d] . . . on five considerations, taken
together.”50 This language of itself does not ordain an analytical
framework to be applied across all cases, and Justice Breyer may have
meant only that in this particular case it was this constellation of factors
that led to the Court’s conclusion, although in dissent, Justice Thomas
described the majority opinion as adopting “a novel five-factor test.”51
What does seem unmistakably clear is that the five considerations were
no mere random collection of observations but were essential to the
majority’s decision that § 4248 is a valid exercise of congressional
authority and, indeed, that their convergence in Comstock was the basis
in law for the judgment of the Court. Justice Breyer went through
the considerations separately and by number, restated them at the end of
his opinion, and in his conclusion told the reader twice over that it was
on the basis of all five considerations, “[t]aken together,” that the majority

49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1969–70 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1956 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1974 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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believed itself able to uphold the provision.52 The five considerations
may not be a test, exactly, but they clearly are not dicta either; they are
the substance of Justice Breyer’s Necessary and Proper Clause analysis.53
We can usefully examine Justice Breyer’s five considerations in the
form he himself summarized them:
(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of
federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s
enactment in light of the Government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the
public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute’s
accommodation of state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope.54

Any opinion that announces such a particularized and unprecedented list
of factors as the basis for the Court’s judgment invites the criticism that
the list is a doctrinal innovation that lacks adequate justification and is
likely to have unhappy consequences, and Justice Thomas in dissent was
happy to oblige. Justice Thomas’s dissent leveled three specific charges
against the five considerations “taken together”: the Court’s “newly minted
test” (1) “cannot be reconciled with the Clause’s plain text”; (2) cannot
be reconciled “with two centuries of our precedents interpreting it,”
although Justice Thomas’s basic complaint in this regard is that the
majority “perfunctorily genuflect[ed]” to McCulloch and “then promptly
abandon[ed]” its approach; and (3) “raises more questions than it
answers.”55 Justice Thomas’s first accusation is inconsequential, but his
second and third are insightful and, I shall argue, persuasive criticisms.
1. A Pseudo-Problem: The Novelty of the Court’s Analysis
Justice Thomas was right, of course, that Justice Breyer’s five
considerations are novel and that there is no immediately obvious sense
in which they map onto the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause, but
in itself, neither observation should carry any critical weight. Legal
opinions interpreting and applying the Constitution almost invariably go
beyond the terminology of the provision(s) they are implementing: Chief

52. Id. at 1965 (majority opinion) (“We take these five considerations together.”);
id. (stating that “[t]aken together, these considerations lead us to conclude” that the
provision is valid).
53. See id. at 1956–65. The author of an opinion for the Court faces the need to
accommodate the views of the other Justices who join the author’s opinion, and therefore
we should not automatically assume that Justice Breyer presented the analysis in
Comstock precisely as he himself saw the issues. But the five-considerations theme
structures his entire opinion, and his insistence on the importance of the considerations
as a set makes it difficult to think that he was radically opposed to a multifactor approach
more or less of the sort that he published.
54. Id. at 1965.
55. Id. at 1974–75 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch, which Justice Thomas evidently
respects, was largely without judicial precedent,56 ranged far beyond the
language of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and indeed came to
exegesis of the clause only late in Marshall’s discussion of Congress’s
powers.57 When an opinion creates new constitutional doctrine, its
language is novel and distinct from that of the constitutional text by
definition: the very purpose of doctrine is to create judicially manageable
standards for carrying out the mandate of constitutional texts that the
Court does not find possible to treat as a simple rule.58 Whatever the
exact status of Justice Breyer’s five considerations, the fact that they are
substantially his creation rather than a paraphrase of the Necessary and
Proper Clause or of the Court’s earlier decisions is of no moment.
2. A Real Problem: Inconsistency with McCulloch
The dissent’s accusation that Justice Breyer’s five considerations are
inconsistent with precedent, in contrast, is a serious and plausible
criticism: Justice Thomas was on solid ground in finding the opinion in
Comstock in serious tension with the opinion in McCulloch, although in
what follows, I shall generally present my own argument on that score
rather than Justice Thomas’s. In fact, three out of the five considerations
that Justice Breyer invoked as part of the justification for upholding
56. McCulloch, to be sure, clearly reflected Chief Justice Marshall’s familiarity
with the reasoning in Alexander Hamilton’s 1791 cabinet opinion defending the
constitutionality of a national bank, see, e.g., J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 600 (2002), and implicitly
corrected Marshall’s earlier and much cruder treatment of Congress’s implied powers in
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805), see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 162–
64 (1985) (comparing Fisher with McCulloch and concluding that the later “formulation
is a vast improvement upon Fisher”). This said, few readers have doubted the
substantial originality—novelty, if you will—of Chief Justice Marshall’s language—or
its freedom from a slavish adherence to the Constitution’s wording.
57. In his classic discussion of the opinion in McCulloch, James Boyd White noted
that Chief Justice Marshall’s language sought to rebut the “obvious criticism[],” which
his opinion itself had raised, that Marshall’s method of “expounding” the Constitution
involved “finding in it what simply is not there.” JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS
LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER,
AND COMMUNITY 256 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because of the
character of the Constitution’s own language, the activity of interpreting it cannot be
limited to looking to see what is there. See id.
58. See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional
Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1740–47
(2005).
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§ 4248 are immaterial under McCulloch to the resolution of that issue.
Let us see how that is so.
The second consideration. The Comstock judgment rests in part,
according to Justice Breyer, on the fact that § 4248 “constitutes a modest
addition to a set of federal prison-related mental-health statutes that have
existed for many decades.”59 Justice Breyer conceded that “even a
longstanding history of related federal action does not demonstrate a
statute’s constitutionality,” and he made no express reference to the
argument from societal or popular reliance often thought to counsel
acceptance of longstanding governmental practices.60 Instead, the majority
Justices evidently thought § 4248’s “modest[y]” as an “addition to a
longstanding federal statutory framework, which has been in place since
1855,” was a constitutionally significant factor because, in some fashion,
it supports the “the reasonableness of the relation between the new
statute and pre-existing federal interests.”61 This must mean, if it is to
have constitutional significance, that a more innovative exercise of
congressional power, one not as “reasonably” related to preexisting
federal interests, might be unjustified under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
This is not a line of reasoning that one should expect to read in an
opinion purporting to follow McCulloch. Chief Justice Marshall began
his analysis with a discussion of “the former proceedings of the nation
respecting” the national bank, in the light of which the bank’s validity
could “scarcely be considered as an open question” in 1819.62 But his
treatment of the political history of the statute before him was very
different from Justice Breyer’s. Chief Justice Marshall made nothing of
the bank as a “modest” change in federal law—the bank was one of the
most socially consequential federal instrumentalities in the early Republic—or
its fit with longstanding federal policy and interests—there was no
national bank between 1811 and 1816. For Chief Justice Marshall, the
significance of the statute’s history was, in part, the issue of reliance that
lingers only as a whisper in Justice Breyer’s opinion,63 but its deeper
importance for him lay in the seriousness with which the national
political process had aired the question of the bank’s validity: “It would
require no ordinary share of intrepidity to assert that a measure adopted
59. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1958 (majority opinion).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1958, 1961.
62. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401–02 (1819).
63. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1958 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664,
678 (1970) (stating that a long “unbroken practice . . . is not something to be lightly cast
aside”)). So perhaps Justice Breyer did mean to invoke the argument from reliance,
albeit softly.
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under these circumstances was a bold and plain usurpation, to which the
constitution gave no countenance.”64 Section 4248 can lay no claim to a
similar history of constitutional debate in Congress and the executive,
but by McCulloch’s standards, that merely eliminates one argument in
favor of the statute’s constitutionality. There is nothing in McCulloch
even hinting that the novelty or the broad scope of a congressional act
ought to weigh against its validity as an exercise of implied power.
Indeed, McCulloch’s conclusion in the bank’s favor, which Chief Justice
Marshall was careful to state the Court thought clear quite apart from its
history, seems to me irrefutable proof that Marshall and his colleagues
would have found Justice Breyer’s modesty and nonnovelty consideration
irrelevant to the question of § 4248’s constitutionality.65
The fourth consideration. The opinion of the Court gave as another
constitutional consideration the majority’s conclusion that § 4248 “properly
accounts for state interests” because it “requires accommodation of state
interests” in various ways, ultimately by allowing a relevant state to take
custody of anyone detained pursuant to a § 4248 proceeding.66 Why this
fact was of constitutional significance to the majority is unclear. The
Comstock defendants argued to the Court that § 4248 is improper under
the Necessary and Proper Clause because it “encroaches on the States’
police and parens patriae powers [and thereby] assum[es] these core
state functions.”67 The idea that there is some substantive core of state
functions that Congress may not in effect “assume” through the use of its
enumerated powers is not new, of course, but the Court has repeatedly
rejected it.68 If a legislative act is within the authority the Constitution
delegates to Congress, its enactment is by definition not the exercise of a

64. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402. The First Congress adopted the first
bank bill only after the most serious constitutional debate, with James Madison leading
the opposition in the House. George Washington signed the bill into law only after
deliberating over the conflicting constitutional arguments of Edmund Randolph, Thomas
Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton. Madison, who was President in 1816, signed the
second bank bill into law after the lessons of experience had persuaded most of the first
bill’s original opponents that a national bank was a practical necessity. See id. at 401–02
for Chief Justice Marshall’s elegant, if tendentious and oblique, summary of this history.
65. On the validity of the National Bank Act independent of the argument from
political precedent, see id. at 402. Chief Justice Marshall’s remarks about the political
history “are not made under the impression that, were the question entirely new, the law
would be found irreconcilable with the constitution.” Id.
66. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962.
67. Brief for Respondents at 37, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (No. 08-1224).
68. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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power reserved to the states, as Justice Breyer recognized.69 In executing its
delegated powers, as Justice Thomas pointed out, Congress may override or
accommodate state policies as it chooses: Article I has already made all
the accommodation of state interests that is constitutionally required.70
The various features of § 4248 that limit the federal process Congress
established in the interest of allowing or encouraging states to address
the issue of sexually dangerous persons may be good policy, but their
presence is of no constitutional significance under McCulloch, and the
implication in Justice Breyer’s opinion that the absence of such
accommodations might weaken the argument for § 4248’s validity is
flatly contrary to McCulloch.
The fifth consideration. As yet another factor in the argument for
§ 4248’s validity, Justice Breyer pointed to the section’s “narrow scope.”71
Justice Breyer noted that he was answering the Comstock defendants’
argument that under the Necessary and Proper Clause, “Congress’
authority can be no more than one step removed from a specifically
enumerated power,” and his opinion skillfully shows the incompatibility
of this argument with precedent and with Chief Justice Marshall’s
discussion in McCulloch.72 In principle, and under McCulloch, there of
course must be a real sense in which legislation Congress adopts under
the clause is a means to the execution of some enumerated power: Chief
Justice Marshall used the expression plainly adapted to such an end.73
As McCulloch also insisted, however, the question whether the means
are closely enough related to a proper end to warrant the exercise of
implied power is a question for Congress: “[T]o undertake here to inquire
into the degree of its necessity [as a means to a legitimate end], would be
to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread
on legislative ground.”74 Whatever the extent of the judiciary’s competence
69. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962 (“The powers ‘delegated to the United States by
the Constitution’ include those specifically enumerated powers listed in Article I along
with the implementation authority granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Virtually by definition, these powers are not powers that the Constitution ‘reserved to the
States.’”).
70. Id. at 1982 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[O]nce it is determined that Congress has
the authority to provide for the civil detention of sexually dangerous persons,
Congress . . . ‘may impose its will on the States’ [and therefore] Section 4248’s
[‘accommodations’ are] thus not a matter of constitutional necessity, but an act of
legislative grace.”). Comstock did not address the question of whether the Constitution
imposes on Congress a relevant state sovereignty limitation on the exercise of its
Article I powers that is analytically distinct from the limitation implicit in the
enumeration of its powers and thus parallel to the anticommandeering principle
recognized in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
71. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1965 (majority opinion).
72. Id. at 1963–64.
73. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
74. Id.

732

POWELL POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 48: 713, 2011]

9/23/2011 1:12 PM

The Regrettable Clause
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

to ensure that there is some means-end relationship between impliedpower legislation and enumerated-power end,75 the real problem with the
one-step-removed argument is that in application it amounts to nothing
but an a priori characterization: whether § 4248 is one step removed
from the enumerated Article I powers or many, and how many, is simply
a question of how one states the answer verbally.76 McCulloch gives no
support to such verbal quibbles as a part of constitutional law: Chief
Justice Marshall wrote not a single sentence breaking down the national
bank into its various facets or considering the extent to which individual
parts of the system were related more or less directly to the financial
operations of the federal government that the National Bank Act was a
means of executing.77
Justice Breyer made this point effectively but muddied the analytical
waters unnecessarily by pairing his rejection of the one-step-removed
argument with a second and quite different contention that § 4248 is not
“too sweeping in its scope” or “is narrow in scope . . . appl[ying] to only
a small fraction of federal prisoners,” and that it is a “narrowly tailored
means of pursuing the Government’s legitimate interest as a federal
custodian.”78 As we have already seen in the discussion of the second
consideration, under McCulloch, both on its facts and in Chief Justice
Marshall’s analysis, the narrowness of a congressional exercise of
implied power is not—and indeed cannot be if McCulloch itself was
rightly decided—relevant to its constitutionality. The legitimacy of a
75. Justice Breyer’s third consideration addresses this issue, concluding that
§ 4248 “satisfies the Constitution’s insistence that a federal statute represent a rational
means for implementing a constitutional grant of legislative authority.” Comstock, 130
S. Ct. at 1962.
76. Nothing in principle—or in McCulloch—suggests any reason why the
following are not equally fair descriptions of § 4248, or why it should matter if you
choose one of the following over the other: (1) the federal prison system, of which
§ 4248 is a part, is a means of carrying into execution the enumerated powers, such as
the interstate commerce power, authorizing Congress to enact criminal statutes;
(2) § 4248 is a means toward carrying into execution the criminal statutes that are a
means toward carrying into execution the enumerated powers; or (3) § 4248 is a means
toward carrying into execution the program for addressing the discharge of prisoners that
is a means toward carrying into execution the prison system that is a means toward
carrying into execution the criminal statutes. Lawyers could play this game with almost
endless variations. None of them have any place in a constitutional universe in which
McCulloch is authoritative.
77. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424 (stating in conclusory fashion that
the bank’s “branches . . . being conducive to the complete accomplishment of the object,
are equally constitutional”).
78. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963–65.
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given exercise of implied power, under McCulloch, has nothing to do
with its conceptual “size,” 79 and the entire tenor of Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion negates any possibility that he believed judges ought
to make a metaphorical examination of how closely Congress has
tailored its means to its end. Justice Breyer’s suggestion to the contrary
is doubly misleading: it implies that § 4248 might have been more
questionable if it had applied to a larger percentage of federal prisoners
or if it had struck the majority Justices as too sweeping or too loosely
tailored. Doing so invites future legal wrangles over arguments couched
in those terms and is strangely out of accord with McCulloch.
The inconsistency between McCulloch and Justice Breyer’s opinion
runs deeper than the particulars of the two opinions. Chief Justice
Marshall’s 1819 opinion, taken as a whole, is an emphatic statement that
Congress has “ample means” to make the most beneficial use of its
“ample [enumerated] powers, on the due execution of which the
happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends,” and to do so
without the judiciary engaging in second-guessing legislative decisions
about how best to serve the nation.80 Chief Justice Marshall thought it as
much a “waste [of] time and argument” to prove the existence under the
Constitution of “this useful and necessary right of the legislature to
select its means” as to prove that Congress can legislate at all.81
“As little can it be required to prove . . . . [that Congress] might employ
those which, in its judgment, would most advantageously effect the
object to be accomplished.”82
It was the critics of McCulloch, not the Marshall Court, who wanted to
parse with a suspicious eye Congress’s exercises of power, using what
Chief Justice Marshall later termed “well-digested, but refined and
metaphysical reasoning” that he thought made sense only on the
“postulates, that the powers expressly granted to the government of the
Union, are to be contracted, by construction, into the narrowest possible
compass, and that the original powers of the States are retained, if any
possible construction will retain them.”83 It would be absurd to suspect
Justice Breyer of harboring strict-construction views of Congress’s
powers, but “taken together,” to borrow his phrase, the five-considerations
analysis is open to Justice Thomas’s accusation that it is unfaithful to
McCulloch. “At a minimum,” as Justice Thomas commented, “this shift
79. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407–08 (“It can never be pretended that
these vast powers draw after them others of inferior importance, merely because they are
inferior. Such an idea can never be advanced.”).
80. Id. at 408.
81. Id. at 419.
82. Id.
83. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 220 (1824).
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from the two-step McCulloch framework to this five-consideration
approach warrants an explanation as to why McCulloch is no longer
good enough.”84 The opinion of the Court neither notes nor explains its
departures from McCulloch.
3. A Second Real Problem: The Creation of Confusion
Justice Thomas lodged a second, equally powerful complaint about
Justice Breyer’s five-considerations discussion: “It also raises more
questions than it answers.”85
Must each of the five considerations exist before the Court sustains future
federal legislation as proper exercises of Congress’ Necessary and Proper
Clause authority? What if the facts of a given case support a finding of only
four considerations? Or three? And if three or four will suffice, which three or
four are imperative? At a minimum, this shift from the two-step McCulloch
framework to this five-consideration approach warrants an explanation as to . . .
which of the five considerations will bear the most weight in future cases,
assuming some number less than five suffices. (Or, if not, why all five are
required.) The Court provides no answers to these questions.86

Justice Thomas is right: Justice Breyer’s insistence that all five
considerations, taken together, ground the Court’s decision leaves the
reader with no sense of how the factors relate.
The first consideration—“the Necessary and Proper Clause grants
Congress broad authority”87—is an abstract observation about the
Constitution; it is far from meaningless—at base it repeats a central
theme in McCulloch—but it does very little to advance analysis when it
is combined with the other considerations, all of which relate to the
specific statute under review in Comstock. The other considerations, and
Justice Breyer’s explication of them, emphasize the modesty in
innovation, narrowness of scope, and lack of intrusion on state interests
that the Court found to characterize § 4248. There is no indication
whatever of how far the general consideration’s broad view of the
implied powers can carry an argument for a different federal statute’s
validity in the absence of these restrictive considerations. Justice Breyer
may not have intended the five considerations as a doctrinal test to be

84. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1975 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1956 (majority opinion).
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applied mechanically in later cases, but he must have realized that
many advocates and lower court judges would treat them as some sort of
test or framework, so we must assume that he is content for them to do
so.
This was, I think, a mistake and plainly one. It is less clear after
Comstock than it was before how a member of Congress considering
a bill, a lawyer writing a brief, or a lower court judge deciding a case
ought to analyze the constitutionality of congressional measures that go
beyond the letter of Article I. Chief Justice Marshall long ago warned of
the subtle danger in construing Congress’s powers in an overly
legalistic, hairsplitting fashion that “may so entangle and perplex the
understanding, as to obscure principles, which were before thought quite
plain, and induce doubts where, if the mind were to pursue its own
course, none would be perceived.”88 The opinion of the Court in Comstock,
regrettably, substituted perplexity and doubt for the clarity that is the
legacy of McCulloch.
B. Argument by Slogan: Justice Kennedy’s Opinion
Concurring in the Judgment
Justice Anthony Kennedy agreed with the majority, without significant
elaboration, that § 4248 is constitutional as an incident to Congress’s
powers to enact criminal statutes.89 He wrote separately not to elaborate
on what he thought was the correct Necessary and Proper Clause
analysis but to indicate certain errors in the opinion of the Court: “[T]o
withhold assent from certain statements and propositions of the Court’s
opinion. . . . [and] to caution that the Constitution does require the
invalidation of congressional attempts to extend federal powers in some
instances.”90 Justice Kennedy’s first stated concern was with Justice
Breyer’s claim that pursuant to McCulloch, the Court looks “to see
whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the
implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”91 Justice
Kennedy made several observations about Justice Breyer’s assertion, all

88. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 220.
89. Justice Kennedy apparently rested the validity of § 4248 solely on the need “to
ensure that an abrupt end to the federal detention of prisoners does not endanger third
parties.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring). His explanation of
why this “obligation, parallel in some respects to duties defined in tort law,” gives rise to
congressional legislative power is extremely brief: “Having acted within its constitutional
authority to detain the person, the National Government can acknowledge a duty to
ensure that an abrupt end to the detention does not prejudice the States and their
citizens.” Id.
90. Id. at 1966.
91. Id. at 1956 (majority opinion).
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of them correct: (1) although the Court has used the language of rational
relationship or basis in due process and Commerce Clause analysis, the
terminology has not played a role in guiding judicial review under the
Necessary and Proper Clause; (2) the case Justice Breyer cited for the
assertion, United States v. Sabri, addressed an area, the spending power,
where constitutional analysis is underdeveloped; (3) it is unclear that
rational basis talk carries the same meaning in both of the contexts
where it is familiar; and (4) in any event, these are all separate areas of
constitutional inquiry in which the proper judicial concerns may be
different.92 This is good, close judicial reasoning, presumably intended
to prevent Justice Breyer’s use of rational relationship language from
hardening into Necessary and Proper Clause dogma without further
consideration.
When Justice Kennedy turned to his second concern, the Court’s
apparently inadequate “explanation of the Tenth Amendment,” however,
the clarity of his opinion faltered.93 After a puzzling paragraph suggesting
that the majority had denied that “[r]esidual power, sometimes referred
to . . . as the police power, belongs to the States and the States alone,”94
Justice Kennedy presented his own, presumably superior explanation of
the constitutional issues:
It is correct in one sense to say that if the National Government has the power to
act under the Necessary and Proper Clause then that power is not one reserved
to the States. But the precepts of federalism embodied in the Constitution
inform which powers are properly exercised by the National Government in the
first place. It is of fundamental importance to consider whether essential
attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that is a factor suggesting
that the power is not one properly within the reach of federal power.95

This paragraph is as analytically confusing as Justice Kennedy’s
earlier discussion of the applicability of rational basis was precise. It is
not correct “in one sense” to say that if Congress has the power to do
something under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the power is not one

92. Id. at 1966–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S.
600, 605 (2004) (citing McCulloch generally as “establishing review for means-ends
rationality under the Necessary and Proper Clause”).
93. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
94. Id. I can see nothing in Justice Breyer’s opinion that justifies the suggestion.
See id. at 1964 (majority opinion) (noting that the Founders denied the federal
government “a general ‘police power . . . and reposed [it] in the States’”).
95. Id. at 1967–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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of those reserved to the states: it is correct to say so, period. Congress’s
implied powers pursuant to that clause are just as fully powers
“delegated to the United States by the Constitution”96 as the specific
enumerated powers, and consequently the Tenth Amendment’s reservation
of nondelegated powers to the states is irrelevant once it is established
that a given federal law is a valid exercise of Necessary and Proper
Clause authority.97 The proposition in the second sentence that the federal
structure of American government is relevant to the correct interpretation of
Congress’s powers—including its implied powers—is sound, but it is
hard to imagine, unfortunately, what to make of the following sentence
about “state sovereignty.” The opinion gives no clear indication of what
the “essential attributes of state sovereignty” are, or how a judge ought
to deal with an act of Congress that compromises them—such an
intrusion is only a suggestive factor, and we are not told what the other
factors might be or how to weigh them.98
Justice Kennedy’s opinion continues this almost studied ambiguity in
its next paragraph, where the reader is told:
The Court’s discussion of the Tenth Amendment invites the inference that
restrictions flowing from the federal system are of no import when defining the
limits of the National Government’s power, as it proceeds by first asking
whether the power is within the National Government’s reach, and if so it
discards federalism concerns entirely.99

The syntax of this sentence is overloaded, but Justice Kennedy’s point
seems to be that (1) because the majority analyzed the issue of
congressional power “by first asking whether the power [to enact
96. Id. at 1962 (majority opinion) (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. X).
97. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2731–32 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “[t]he Tenth
Amendment . . . is not implicated” when legislation is enacted “under the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses” (quoting Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 22
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted))). The state autonomy
principles discussed below, see infra note 98, rest on a different logic than the Tenth
Amendment’s reminder that Congress does not possess all conceivable legislative
authority: rather than shielding specific substantive areas of state law from congressional
intrusion, those principles prohibit Congress from adopting certain means of executing
powers it fully enjoys. Such state autonomy principles are parallel to the limiting effect
of constitutional provisions such as the First Amendment.
98. The term attributes of state sovereignty could refer on its own to the
anticommandeering and state sovereign immunity principles that the Court has
recognized as imposing prohibitions on Congress’s use of its Article I powers. See, e.g.,
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78–79 (2000) (state sovereign immunity);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (anticommandeering principle). As the
Court has construed those principles, however, they impose absolute rules rather than
subject federal laws to multifactor analysis, so Justice Kennedy’s language would be a
strangely inexact way of referring to them.
99. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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§ 4248] is within” Congress’s authority, (2) the Court invited the
inference that federalism restrictions are “of no import” in defining
congressional power, and (3) therefore it “discards federalism concerns
entirely.” The proposition is as difficult to follow as the sentence is to
parse. It is quite unclear how one ought to determine whether the power
to enact a law is within Congress’s “reach” other than by “first asking
whether” it is. It would be possible in theory to begin a review of the
constitutionality of an act of Congress by working through a list of the
presumptive prohibitions on its exercise of its powers—the First
Amendment, the anticommandeering principle, the nondelegation
doctrine, and so on—but as the reader knows, no issues involving such
prohibitions were before the Court in Comstock, and so the complaint
about the Court’s starting point is mysterious if not bootless.
Nor is it at all obvious why beginning with the question “does this law
under review appear to be within the ostensible scope of Congress’s
authority?” should interfere conceptually with asking whether what one
might otherwise think is the scope of Congress’s power ought to be
interpreted more narrowly out of federalism concerns. In fact, of course,
Justice Breyer spent considerable energy exploring § 4248’s solicitude
for “federalism concerns,” indeed in ways that I have argued gave
improper latitude to those concerns as a matter of constitutional law.100
There is as a result considerable irony in Justice Kennedy’s complaint
that Justice Breyer’s opinion dismissed “the function and province of the
States” too cavalierly.101 The real problem with Justice Kennedy’s opinion,
however, is not his arguable misreading of Justice Breyer’s opinion.
It lies rather in Justice Kennedy’s assumption that he has “explain[ed]
why the Court ignores important limitations stemming from federalism
principles.”102 Justice Kennedy’s discussion of federalism is opaque, at
best; at points it is either confused or clearly erroneous; and it is onesided as well: the supremacy of national power within its delegated
sphere is as much a part of American federalism and “our constitutional
structure” as is the “province of the States.”103 It is quite unclear what
Justice Kennedy would have courts do in Necessary and Proper Clause
analysis to achieve the right balance between national authority and state
autonomy, and it is similarly unclear in what way the Court has gotten
100.
101.
102.
103.

See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id.
Id.
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this balance wrong. Federalism in this opinion is a slogan, without
unambiguous content or analytical bite.
C. Argument by Adjective: Justice Alito’s Opinion
Concurring in the Judgment
In the first paragraph of his opinion, Justice Samuel Alito explained
that he agreed with the Court’s conclusion but declined to join its
opinion because he was “concerned about the breadth of the Court’s
language, and the ambiguity of the standard that the Court applies.”104
Despite these concerns, Justice Alito concluded that § 4248 is a
constitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause “on narrow grounds.”105
Justice Alito spent the next few pages laying out a lucid, succinct
version of what I have called the obvious justification for § 4248.106 As
his first paragraph implies was his aim, he achieved a clarity that
escaped the Court’s five-considerations discussion. There is, however,
one puzzle about his discussion, stemming from his introduction to it: in
what sense did Justice Alito believe his grounds for upholding the
provision “narrow[er]” than the Court’s, and why did he think the
problem with Justice Breyer’s language was its “breadth”? It is true that
Justice Breyer referred several times to the breadth of Congress’s
implied powers,107 whereas Justice Alito warned the reader that “[t]he
104. Id. (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 1968–69.
106. See id. at 1969–70.
107. See id. at 1956 (majority opinion) (stating that the Necessary and Proper
Clause confers “broad authority”); id. at 1958 (“Congress nonetheless possesses broad
authority to [enact criminal statutes and laws governing prisons and prisoners] in the
course of ‘carrying into Execution’ the enumerated powers.”); id. at 1965 (referring to
“the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause”). Justice Breyer also quoted remarks
from an earlier opinion of the Court that stress the flexibility and breadth of the
Constitution’s delegations of power to Congress: “The Federal Government undertakes
activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers . . . . Yet the powers
conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in language
broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government’s role.” Id. at 1965
(quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The plausibility of treating this quotation as telltale evidence that
Justice Breyer is a dangerous centralizer diminishes considerably when one realizes that
the original author of the words was Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, one of the Justices in
recent history most concerned to ensure that the Court respects the constitutional role of
the states. See Judith Olans Brown & Peter D. Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 50 (2000) (“Justice O’Connor . . . has long been the Court’s
most outspoken advocate for state autonomy.”); M. David Gelfand & Keith Werhan,
Federalism and Separation of Powers on a “Conservative” Court: Currents and CrossCurrents from Justices O’Connor and Scalia, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1443, 1449 (1990) (“Of
the current Justices, O’Connor has expressed perhaps the strongest and most consistent
commitment to judicial defense of state governments against federal interference.”).
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Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress carte blanche. . . .
And it is an obligation of this Court to enforce compliance with that
limitation.”108 It is also true that it took Justice Alito fewer pages than
Justice Breyer needed to lay out a legal rationale for the Court’s
judgment, but surely Alito’s criticism is not directed toward Breyer’s
prolixity. Justice Breyer’s opinion, as we have seen, analyzes the
Necessary and Proper Clause issue through a set of considerations that
appear to build in more concern for state autonomy and more extensive
judicially enforceable limits on Congress’s legislative discretion than
Chief Justice Marshall allowed for in McCulloch. Justice Alito’s sparer
analysis, if anything, suggests that it is Justice Breyer rather than Alito
who has adopted a narrower view of congressional power.
The reader may wish to look again at Justice Alito’s spare—and
I think convincing—demonstration, quoted above, that § 4248 is a
proper means of “carry[ing] into execution the enumerated powers on
which the federal criminal laws rest.”109 Nothing in it, or in the slightly
longer discussion in which it is embedded, invites courts to take
into consideration their views on whether a statute resting on the
Necessary and Proper Clause provision comes from a sufficiently long
enough history of federal involvement in the issue, displays an adequate
degree of federal accommodation to state interests, or is narrowly
tailored enough to achieve its end. Although Justice Breyer apparently
thought the Justices’ views on these issues matter constitutionally,
Justice Alito, in contrast, did little more than register the “congressional
judgment” that each link in the connection between the enumerated
powers and § 4248 is “necessary and proper” and assert, almost
entirely by implication, that Congress’s judgment is, as to each link,
constitutionally acceptable.110 Justice Breyer’s opinion thus appears to
incorporate into the Necessary and Proper Clause analysis more
concern for state autonomy and more extensive judicially enforceable

108. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1969. Justice Alito did include a paragraph on a Judicial Conference
report that Justice Breyer also discussed, id. at 1959–60 (majority opinion), which
provided an empirical basis for the fear that because of state inaction “a disturbing
number of cases” existed in which released federal prisoners “would present a danger to
any communities in which they chose to live or visit.” Id. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring).
Justice Alito does not comment on the precise legal significance of the report’s
existence. Perhaps the most natural reading of his opinion is that the report serves
simply to indicate the sort of concern that moved Congress to enact § 4248.
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limits on Congress’s legislative discretion than does Justice Alito’s sparer
analysis. Justice Alito’s approach, I think, is demonstrably closer to
McCulloch than Justice Breyer’s opinion, but by the same token his
reasoning surely takes a less restrictive view of Congress’s authority
under the clause and a less expansive view of the latitude a court has in
second-guessing the “congressional judgment.” I write this not to
criticize but to praise Justice Alito’s opinion and also to register puzzlement
over Alito’s criticism of Justice Breyer’s “breadth” of language.
Regrettably, in the last substantive paragraph in his opinion, Justice
Alito retreated to the rhetorical ambiguity of his introductory comments.
After restating McCulloch’s gloss on the Necessary and Proper Clause as
“requir[ing] an ‘appropriate’ link between a power conferred by the
Constitution and the law enacted by Congress” and restating § 4248’s
conformity with that requirement, Justice Alito distinguished Comstock
from
a case in which it is merely possible for a court to think of a rational basis on
which Congress might have perceived an attenuated link between the powers
underlying the federal criminal statutes and the challenged civil commitment
provision. Here, there is a substantial link to Congress’ constitutional powers.111

As a summary of Justice Alito’s reasoning, this is almost empty, an
announcement of the adjectival labels to be used when a law fails or
satisfies, respectively, a standard of judgment that the labels do not
explain. What is it about the link between § 4248 and Congress’s
enumerated powers that makes it “substantial” instead of “attenuated”?
Apparently it is not simply the rationality of the presumed
“congressional judgment” that each step in the chain is necessary and
proper—or appropriate. 112 But if Congress’s own judgment is not a
sufficient constitutional basis, standing alone, to justify judicial
validation of an implied-power law—and recall that Justice Alito does
not invoke any other basis on which to rest his approval of Congress’s
imputed judgments—what other aspect of his argument for § 4248’s
validity shows that its link to the enumerated powers was “substantial”?
We are given no answer other than the logical but surely unimaginable
possibility that Justice Alito thinks it proper for a judge to rely on an
unarticulated and intuitive response to the question of appropriateness
under the clause as the basis for upholding or striking down an act of
Congress. Adopting “I know it when I see it” as the standard for
implementing the Necessary and Proper Clause would make the Court’s
five considerations look like a model of precision, and it would be ironic

111.
112.
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indeed if Justice Alito’s opinion had in fact adopted this as a standard of
review in light of his criticism of the Court’s ambiguity.113
By using terms such as attenuated and substantial, Justice Alito
strongly implies that his labels have precise conceptual content despite
the absence of any indication as to that content in the rest of his opinion.
Constitutional history affords other examples of Justices’ using paired
antonyms in constitutional decisionmaking; the direct/indirect distinction
in Commerce Clause adjudication is perhaps the most famous.114 These
earlier ventures in explaining conclusions by applying adjectives do not
breed confidence in the value of another such exercise. Justice Alito’s
otherwise admirable opinion will turn out to exercise a regrettable
influence if it inspires lawyers and judges to think that the legitimacy of
implied-power legislation turns on whether someone thinks the law’s
connection to the enumerated powers is better termed attenuated or
substantial.
D. Argument by Obfuscation: Justice Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas’s dissent, as we have already seen, registered several
persuasive criticisms of Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court.115 The
dissent, furthermore, ultimately invokes a constitutional vision that has
deep roots in our history. I will take up the question of what to make of
that vision later. As is true of the other opinions filed in Comstock,
however, there is an aspect of the dissent that reflects, I think, a failure
in craftsmanship. In Justice Thomas’s case, the fault lies in his use of
question-begging assertions—assumptions that tend to misstate the
constitutional issue before the Court and obfuscate the real arguments
for and against his views.

113. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(adopting the “I know it when I see it” test, despite its vagueness). I intend no
disparagement of Justice Stewart’s famous description of “hard-core” pornography as he
used it in a discussion of the First Amendment category of obscenity. Justice Stewart
was, I think, making the entirely plausible claim that limiting constitutional obscenity to
hardcore pornography would produce a workable judicial standard even if hardcore
pornography cannot be reduced to algorithmic form.
114. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307–10 (1936).
115. See supra Part III.A.
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Consider the second paragraph in Justice Thomas’s opinion, with
which he opened his legal analysis.116
“As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual
sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government.”117 In our system,
the Federal Government’s powers are enumerated, and hence limited.118 Thus,
Congress has no power to act unless the Constitution authorizes it to do so.119
The States, in turn, are free to exercise all powers that the Constitution does not
withhold from them.120 This constitutional structure establishes different
default rules for Congress and the States: Congress’ powers are “few and
defined,” while those that belong to the States “remain . . . numerous and
indefinite.”121

At first glance this paragraph might seem a rather harmless bit of purple
prose, perhaps even slightly reminiscent of Chief Justice Marshall’s
famously grand—or grandiloquent, if you do not like it—opinion in
McCulloch, although of course Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch was
freely composing, whereas Justice Thomas followed the unfortunate
practice in recent decades of constructing his paragraph out of a skein of
quotations from other authorities. Justice Thomas’s language in this
opening paragraph, however, is very like Chief Justice Marshall’s in that
there is far more going on than a judge’s indulging a taste for sweeping
statements.122
Justice Thomas’s first sentence, quoted from an opinion written by
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, implies that it is uncontroversial to
describe the federal system created by the Constitution as one of “dual
sovereignty.” One can perhaps accept Justice O’Connor’s language as
stating a generally shared proposition, but only at the cost of draining the
116. For the following quotation from Justice Thomas’s dissent in Comstock, see
130 S. Ct. at 1970–71 (Thomas, J., dissenting), the citations have been omitted and
footnotes added for ease of reference.
117. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
118. Id. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (“This
government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.”)).
119. Id. (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000)).
120. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. X).
121. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison)).
122. Spencer Roane, one of the severest contemporaneous critics of McCulloch,
repeatedly attacked what he viewed as Chief Justice Marshall’s deliberate rhetorical
excesses. See, e.g., Spencer Roane, “Hampden” Essay No. III, RICHMOND ENQUIRER
(June 18, 1819) (“The supreme court has also claimed such enlargement [of
congressional authority] on the ground, that our constitution is one of a vast republic,
whose limits they have pompously swelled, and greatly exaggerated.”), reprinted in
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 106, 127 (Gerald Gunther ed.,
1969); McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 408 (“Throughout this vast republic, from the
St. Croix to the Gulph of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be
collected and expended, armies are to be marched and supported.”). One need not accept
Roane’s narrow views of federal power to agree with him that Chief Justice Marshall
was using his pen in the McCulloch opinion to make his constitutional views seem
inescapable.
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sentence of any analytically useful meaning. Sovereignty is a notoriously
protean term in American constitutional law. “The Court seems to
employ [sovereignty language in relation to the states] in a number of
ways, not all of which are easy to relate to one another. The consequence is
that general assertions about ‘state sovereignty’ are without clear
meaning.”123 The same is true of the specific term dual sovereignty
Justice Thomas quoted from Gregory: “For the most part, references to a
principle of dual sovereignty are colorful ways of saying that federalism
exists.”124 Justice Thomas’s next few sentences might seem to point in
that direction: no one on the Court, indeed no one in the constitutional
mainstream in history, has doubted that Congress’s powers are
enumerated and limited, or that as a result Congress must have a
constitutional basis for action while the legislative competence of the
states does not depend on, although it is limited by, the United States
Constitution. All of this is incontestable, uncontested by anyone in
Comstock, and by itself of no value whatever in deciding the issue
actually contested before the Court. All harmless platitudes, one might
think.
Platitudes these propositions might be in themselves, but in the
context of Justice Thomas’s quotation of Justice O’Connor, they play a
different role. When Justice Stone in United States v. Darby wrote that
the Tenth Amendment states nothing beyond the circularity that “all is
retained which has not been surrendered,” his comment that the Tenth
Amendment is a “truism” was literally true, and indeed undeniable, but
he clearly was driving home a highly debatable point: Justice Stone was
denying, unmistakably, that the Tenth Amendment carries with it any
suggestion that federalism might put legal limits on Congress’s authority
beyond the limits inherent in the Constitution’s enumeration of
powers. 125 Only a few years before Darby, that proposition had
commanded majority support on the Court, and Darby itself was the case
in which the Court announced its repudiation of federalism as an
independent limitation on the scope of congressional power. There were

123. H. Jefferson Powell & Benjamin J. Priester, Convenient Shorthand: The
Supreme Court and the Language of State Sovereignty, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 645, 646
(2000).
124. Id. at 658 (referring to Justice Thomas’s use of the term dual sovereignty in
Comstock). This Article attempts to catalogue exhaustively and analyze the different
uses to which the Supreme Court has put the language of state sovereignty.
125. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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no published dissents in Darby, but Justice Stone’s “truism” comment
was a means of advocating a controversial position, not the statement of
a jurisprudential fact.126
Justice O’Connor’s “every schoolchild” assertion in Gregory involved
exactly the same type of skillful rhetorical move, even if she aimed it in
almost exactly the opposite direction from Justice Stone’s views on
federalism. Justice O’Connor was a principled advocate of one of the
most robust views of state autonomy from federal interference that any
Justice has espoused in recent decades, but her understanding of what
she called our “federalist structure of joint sovereigns” is hotly disputed
on the current Court and indeed has never been the consensus view, on
or off the Court.127 The implication that the vision of federalism she
intended in writing about dual sovereignty is settled constitutional law
was advocacy rather than fact.128 By quoting Justice O’Connor, Justice
Thomas’s opinion implied that accepting the genuinely uncontroversial
statements that followed the quotation entails accepting Thomas’s highly
controversial views on federalism, and of almost equal importance that it
is Thomas’s position on how to approach an issue of congressional
authority that is truly consistent with McCulloch. The final sentence in
the paragraph, quoting The Federalist, serves the same purpose. James
Madison is unnecessary to prove that questions of federal and state
power require different analyses in light of their different sources; what
The Federalist’s virtually undeniable authority does is support and
further develop a vision of federalism in which the scope of national
legislative competence must be policed in order to safeguard the sovereign
autonomy of the states—in which, contrary to any realistic description
of modern American government, Congress’s exercised powers
really are “few and [narrowly] defined.” In this paragraph, Justice Thomas
presented his platitudes skillfully, and with purpose, so as to render more
plausible his debatable constitutional perspective and to frame his
analysis of § 4248 within an implicit presumption against its validity.
It would prolong this Article unnecessarily to discuss in detail Justice
Thomas’s subsequent use in his dissent of this same technique of subtly
advancing a contestable argument through ostensibly incontestable
126. See id. Chief Justice Hughes privately expressed serious concern about the
constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act that Darby upheld, although he chose
not to write separately. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 209
(1998). Justice McReynolds, who almost certainly thought the Act invalid, did not vote
at the Court’s conference on Darby and retired before the decision was announced. See
id. at 208.
127. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
128. In Gregory, Justice O’Connor’s opinion provoked sharp dissents from four
Justices on the very issue of federalism that she was addressing in the “every
schoolchild” sentence that Justice Thomas quoted in Comstock.
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propositions. We are told, for example, that the opponents of the
Constitution feared the Necessary and Proper Clause and that it was the
supporters who explained that the clause would do no damage to the
principle of enumerated congressional powers—as if anyone on or
before the Comstock Court proposed that the Court act on that tendentious
Antifederalist interpretation;129 that the Constitution does not vest in
Congress plenary authority to prevent social harms—as if anyone were
arguing that the principle of enumerated powers ought to be discarded;130
and that American federalism is intended to protect liberty—as if that in
itself indicates whether a particular act of Congress is within its powers,
powers that were also meant to protect liberty.131 By appearing to
shoulder the burden of defending these unassailed positions, the dissent
repeatedly implied that the defenders of § 4248 flout them. The unwary
reader may well succumb to the invitation, which is surely being
extended, to evaluate the dissent’s specific arguments in a context of
suspicion that the majority Justices simply do not understand, or are
deliberately ignoring, constitutional first principles.
As a specimen of forensic prose, Justice Thomas’s dissent has a
certain undeniable force, but its power derives in large measure from its
repeated obfuscation of the issue actually before the Court—whether
§ 4248 properly carries into execution the enumerated powers that
authorize the criminal statutes under which the defendants were charged.
Because Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that the Necessary and
Proper Clause authorizes laws that “establish prisons . . . and set rules
for the care and treatment of prisoners awaiting trial or serving a
criminal sentence” under laws enacted pursuant to any enumerated
power,132 his real point of disagreement with the Court could easily seem

129. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1972 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
130. See id.
131. Id. at 1982 (“The purpose of [the federalism protection of state sovereignty] is
to preserve the ‘balance of power between the States and the Federal Government . . .
[that] protect[s] our fundamental liberties.’” (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting))). Describing the
relationship between federal and state authority as a “balance of power” is quite odd in
light of the Supremacy Clause. Federal and state powers are constitutionally asymmetric:
although Congress’s powers are constitutionally defined and limited in scope, Congress’s
exercise of those powers is invariably superior to state power within the constitutional
sphere of national authority. The balance of power metaphor, it should be further noted,
comes from a dissent.
132. Id. at 1976–77.
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constitutionally insubstantial, a question of how comprehensive Congress’s
regulations about “the care and treatment of prisoners” ought to be.
Justice Thomas’s skillful redirection of the reader’s attention away from
questions about the specifics of the law under review and toward broad
propositions about constitutional structure resembles Chief Justice
Marshall’s rhetorical strategy in McCulloch, but for a purpose diametrically
opposed to Marshall’s. In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall argued
that our constitutional structure requires the Court to refrain from
entertaining fine-tuned distinctions about the relationship between the
details of the National Bank Act and the powers enumerated in Article I,
as generations of law students have found as they puzzled about exactly
which power the bank is supposed to be carrying into effect. Chief
Justice Marshall’s rhetoric was fundamentally consonant with his
substantive constitutional views. In contrast, Justice Thomas’s insistence
that the Court can and should parse with care the analytical connections
between § 4248 and Article I is at the very heart of his argument that the
Court is in error and the statute is unconstitutional. His heavy reliance
on general propositions obscures, rather than illuminates, his substantive
views.
The last paragraph in the main body of the Comstock dissent’s
analysis, which is located immediately before Justice Thomas’s lament
over the regrettable resuscitation of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
nicely epitomizes his dissent’s overall argumentative strategy: “Absent
congressional action that is in accordance with, or necessary and proper
to, an enumerated power, the duty to protect citizens from violent crime,
including acts of sexual violence, belongs solely to the States.”133 Of
course, no one doubts that “the duty to protect citizens from violent
crime” is the responsibility of the states absent congressional action
properly based on Congress’s enumerated powers.134 That is what it
means to say that the Constitution leaves the “police power” to the
states—legislative responsibility always lies with the states, if anywhere
in the American system, unless the Constitution has conferred it on
Congress. Because Article I delegates to Congress no general power to
suppress violent crime or punish murder, the responsibility of doing so is

133. Id. at 1982–83 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000);
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 426 (1821)).
134. Certainly not the majority. See, e.g., id. at 1956 (majority opinion)
(acknowledging that “[e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more” of
the enumerated powers (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))); id. at 1964 (denying that the
Court’s decision “confers on Congress a general ‘police power, which the Founders
denied the National Government and reposed in the States’” (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S.
at 618)).
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the states’ unless and until Congress addresses such criminal behavior as
a means of executing one of its enumerated powers. When Congress
does so, it is misleading at best to imply that the power of addressing
violent crime belongs “solely” to the states or was “denied” by the
Founders to the national government. What the Constitution does not
give Congress—and thus reserves to the states—is the plenary power to
punish violent crime predicated on nothing beyond the social desirability
of doing so. Section 4248, as we have seen, does not rest on the exercise
of such a plenary power, and as Justice Thomas himself properly admits
at one point, the Necessary and Proper Clause “empowers Congress to
enact laws . . . that are not within its authority to enact in isolation” when
such laws are “in effectuation of [Congress’s] enumerated powers.”135
What was at issue in Comstock was § 4248’s legitimacy as an
“effectuation” of the enumerated powers, and the dissent’s many
reiterations of the principle that Congress is a legislature of enumerated
powers do nothing to address that issue. Justice Thomas’s analysis ends,
as it began, with propositions that are incontestable in themselves,
presented as if they were dispositive of the case and yet irrelevant to the
question actually before the Court.
IV. COMSTOCK AS THE JEFFERSONIAN MCCULLOCH
A. Making Sense of the Comstock Opinions: McCulloch and the
Concept of Pretext
Far from heralding “an unwarranted expansion of federal power” as
Justice Thomas fears,136 Comstock reads more like a warning that the
Court is prepared to subject congressional legislation resting on the
Necessary and Proper Clause to novel and potentially restrictive
constitutional scrutiny, even if the Justices have not yet agreed on
precisely what doctrinal form that scrutiny will take. No Justice, the
reader will recall, wrote or joined an opinion confining itself to what I
have argued is the obvious answer to the question presented in Comstock.
If in fact the courts apply a Comstock-style skepticism in subsequent
Necessary and Proper Clause cases, this doctrinal development may turn
out to have great practical significance: much federal legislation

135. Id. at 1973 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39
(2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
136. Id. at 1976.
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customarily thought of as based on a specific power—the Commerce
Clause in particular—must actually depend on the Necessary and Proper
Clause as a matter of constitutional logic.137 The adoption of a more
skeptical judicial attitude toward Congress’s exercise of its Necessary
and Proper powers would put in question a broader range of federal laws
than the Court’s forays into limiting the Commerce Clause have as yet.
In doing so, such a doctrinal change would also, of necessity, broaden
the scope of the Court’s authority and discretion at the expense of
Congress’s. In making any of the various judgment calls the several
Comstock opinions require or suggest, a court would necessarily exercise
a discretion in judgment that a more straightforward approach to
implied-power analysis would leave to Congress. Think, for example, of
Justice Alito’s express and Justice Breyer’s somewhat more implicit
assumption that the Court should determine whether the link between an
enumerated end and a Necessary and Proper Clause means is too
attenuated.138 If Comstock is an indication of the future, the judiciary’s
currently rather minimal role in determining the scope of national
legislative power will change sharply, with unpredictable results in
practice.
Whether Comstock turns out to be a seminal case or a sport depends
on a variety of factors, some of them with no essential connection to the
substance of constitutional law. But as a decision of law, Comstock
should be judged by, and its capacity to generate further decisions may
well rest on, its compatibility with constitutional law as a whole, and
above all by the relationship readers come to see between Comstock and
McCulloch, a decision whose relevance and iconic status no Justice in
Comstock questioned. On that score, our discussion so far might suggest
that Comstock is likely to fare poorly in the court of hindsight, for in
many ways Comstock seems quite irreconcilable with McCulloch. As
we have seen, McCulloch provides no support at all for the idea broached
by Justices Breyer and Kennedy that the scope of congressional implied
powers is contingent on Congress’s accommodation of state interest, or
for the sort of judicial second-guessing of Congress’s decisions about
legislative means that Justice Alito’s concurrence hints at and Justice
Thomas’s dissent practices. The opinions in Comstock, from Justice
Breyer’s to Justice Thomas’s, all evince a belief in the constitutional
propriety of subjecting congressional choices to close judicial examination

137. This is an important analytical point that Justice Scalia reminded us of
recently. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that the power
to regulate “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce . . . cannot come from
the Commerce Clause alone. . . . [but] derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause”).
138. See supra notes 78–79, 111–14 and accompanying text.
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that is fundamentally alien to the Marshall Court’s insistence that “the
selection of . . . means must rest with the general government,” in other
words, with Congress.139 When the Comstock Justices make their own
judgments about whether the relationship between § 4248 and Article I
is “too attenuated,”140 sufficiently “substantial,”141 or dependent on too
weak “a causal chain of federal powers,”142 their views of the Constitution
and the role of the judiciary sound much closer to those of McCulloch’s
Jeffersonian critics than of Chief Justice Marshall and his colleagues.143
There is, however, another aspect to McCulloch, one that only Justice
Thomas expressly invokes, although in doing so, I think he inadvertently
obscures the real point of his own argument. In his initial discussion of
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion, Justice Thomas describes McCulloch
as ordaining “a two-part test” for evaluating Necessary and Proper
Clause legislation. 144 Justice Thomas, of course, has in mind Justice
Breyer’s novel and amorphous five considerations.
First, the law must be directed toward a “legitimate” end, which McCulloch
defines as one “within the scope of the [C]onstitution”—that is, the powers
expressly delegated to the Federal Government by some provision in the
Constitution. Second, there must be a necessary and proper fit between the
“means” (the federal law) and the “end” (the enumerated power or powers) it is
designed to serve.145

139. See Johnson, supra note 33, at 325.
140. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963 (majority opinion).
141. Id. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
143. This is true even if we assume that the Comstock Justices who voted to uphold
§ 4248 reached a substantive conclusion—being twenty-first century, post-New Deal
judges—that the Marshall Court Justices might have rejected because, as early
nineteenth-century judges, they would not have expected Congress even to consider
enacting such legislation. There is an important historical issue here about the nature of
the Marshall Court’s vision that we cannot and need not address. G. Edward White in
particular has interpreted the Marshall Court’s “nationalism” more as a commitment to
resisting the centrifugal political effects of Jeffersonian states’ rights thinking than as an
affirmative endorsement of broad congressional power understood in what he thinks is
an anachronistic, New Deal fashion. See, e.g., 3–4 G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME C OURT OF THE U NITED S TATES : T HE M ARSHALL C OURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, 1815–35, at 1–2 (1988). Even if Professor White is correct on this score, there
is no reason to think—and he does not claim—that Chief Justice Marshall and his
colleagues meant to countenance legalistic, judicially enforced limits on Congress’s
exercise of implied power in the form the Comstock Justices seem unanimously to think
appropriate.
144. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1971 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (alteration in original).
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Justice Thomas continues by insisting, quite correctly, that these two
inquiries stand in a “linear relationship”146:
Unless the end itself is “legitimate,” the fit between means and end is irrelevant.
In other words, no matter how “necessary” or “proper” an Act of Congress may
be to its objective, Congress lacks authority to legislate if the objective is
anything other than “carrying into Execution” one or more of the Federal
Government’s enumerated powers.147

It is the first part of the McCulloch test that § 4248 fails, in Justice
Thomas’s view, and he therefore declined to decide how the Court should
apply the second, means-end fit part of the test “because . . . the Court’s
decision today errs by skipping the first” part of the McCulloch test.148
This formulation of his approach is, I believe, a misstep on Justice
Thomas’s part. Justice Breyer does in fact identify the enumerated powers
that § 4248 carries into execution—the Article I powers that Congress’s
various criminal laws carry out—as Justice Thomas himself eventually
acknowledges.149 Justice Thomas’s explanation of why Justice Breyer’s
answer is insufficient to satisfy the first part of his McCulloch test is
rather obscure and seems to rest, at least in part, on the due process
concerns that the Court did not grant certiorari to address.150 In the end
the reader is left unsure whether Justice Thomas is saying anything more
than that in his judgment, the sort of comprehensive approach to federal
prisoners who meet the criteria of § 4248 ordained by that section is not
really a necessary part of an overall federal penal system—just the type
of issue that under any reading of McCulloch clearly is a matter
exclusively for Congress.151
There is a better way for Justice Thomas to frame his objection to
Justice Breyer’s claim that § 4248 executes the enumerated powers that
support the criminal laws under which the Comstock defendants were
146. Id. at 1972.
147. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
148. Id. at 1975 n.7 (“I find that debate [of whether there is a proper fit between
means and end] beside the point here . . . .”).
149. Id. at 1977.
150. See id. at 1977–78 (“[Section] 4248 allows a court to civilly commit an
individual without finding that he was ever charged with or convicted of a federal crime
involving sexual violence. . . . [Section] 4248 permits the term of federal civil
commitment to continue beyond the date on which a convicted prisoner’s sentence
expires or the date on which the statute of limitations on an untried defendant’s crime
has run. . . . [Section] 4248 does not require the court to find that the person is likely to
violate a law executing an enumerated power in the future.”). Justice Thomas gives no
clear explanation for why the Necessary and Proper Clause requires § 4248, unlike other
coercive laws governing federal prisoners, to show these sorts of connections to the
original charging offense.
151. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (“[T]he
degree of [the statute’s] necessity, as has been very justly observed, is to be discussed in
another place.”).
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charged; however, it emerges only in the penultimate sentence in his
opinion: “In [upholding § 4248], the Court endorses the precise abuse of
power Article I is designed to prevent—the use of a limited grant of
authority as a ‘pretext . . . for the accomplishment of objects not
intrusted to the government.’”152 The language Justice Thomas quoted is
from McCulloch, from a sentence in the paragraph in which Chief
Justice Marshall emphatically rejected any judicial second-guessing as to
how necessary Congress’s chosen means are to its execution of its
enumerated powers:
Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which
are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress, under the pretext of
executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted
to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a
case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the
law of the land.153

The real constitutional problem Justice Thomas perceives in § 4248, I
think, lies here, in the conviction that in enacting the provision Congress
in fact was not at all concerned with carrying into full, beneficial
execution its power over interstate commerce or any other enumerated
power by criminalizing violations of its rules. Nor, indeed, was Congress
actually interested in creating and administering a federal prison system
adequate to provide for the punishment and care of those convicted of
violating its criminal laws. Its purpose, in Justice Thomas’s view, was
to deal with sexually violent persons, period, and the only substantive
role that its enumerated powers-based criminal laws played in its
scheme was to provide the federal government with a plausible excuse to
exercise coercive jurisdiction over that subset of sexually dangerous
persons who also happen to run afoul of some federal criminal statute.
The pretext for congressional action was supplied by those statutes and
the prison system that exists to make them enforceable, but the true
object of § 4248 is “to protect the community from the dangerous
tendencies” of sexually dangerous persons154—and thus the provision is
a law “for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government.”

152. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1983 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423).
153. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
154. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1974 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)).
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Under McCulloch, therefore, it was the Court’s “painful duty” to
invalidate the statute.
There are, of course, well-known difficulties with requiring judges to
identify legislative purpose in determining the constitutionality of
legislation.155 Justice Thomas’s main discussion of the purpose of § 4248
cites “the face of the Act and . . . the Government’s arguments” in its
brief in concluding that “§ 4248 is aimed at protecting society from acts
of sexual violence [rather than] toward ‘carrying into Execution’ any
enumerated power or powers of the Federal Government.”156 Reliance
on congressional statements of purpose and executive branch briefs has
its obvious limitations, and a critic of Justice Thomas’s assertion that
Congress acted pretextually in enacting § 4248 might respond that
judicial review is not a constitutional law exam in which the Court
checks to see if Congress gave the right answers—and that making it
into one invites genuinely pretextual behavior on the part of the
legislative branch. These and other problems acknowledged, it is fair to
note that (1) it was Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch who identified
the significance of legislative purpose and pretext in Necessary and
Proper Clause analysis, (2) the Court investigates legislative purpose and
attempts to “smoke out” legislative pretext in other constitutional
contexts,157 and (3) it is plausible to think that Congress’s goal in
enacting § 4248 had everything to do with the object of protecting
society from sexual violence and little to do with regulating commerce
or even constructing a comprehensive and reasonable federal prison
system. The conclusion that this goal was so clearly Congress’s primary
purpose is a contestable judgment, of course, but it is no essential feature
of a constitutional doctrine that the doctrinal formula eliminate the
exercise of judgment. Justice Thomas’s approach to the question in
Comstock cannot fairly be rejected on the ground that it is unworkable or
unduly subjective.
This then is a doctrinally cogent statement of Justice Thomas’s
objection to § 4248, one that roots his argument squarely in McCulloch:
the Necessary and Proper Clause is not to be used, as all would agree, to
legitimate congressional legislation that is addressed to constitutionally
155. The argument that legislative purpose is an illusion is, I think, wildly
overblown. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 191–96 (2008). On the
distinction between the ideas of legislative intent and purpose, see FREDERICK SCHAUER,
THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 158–63 (2009).
156. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1974 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
157. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005) (using strict scrutiny
to “smoke out” illegitimate racial purposes); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917 (1995)
(finding that the necessary element of an unconstitutional racial gerrymander is that race
be the “predominant factor” among the purposes for which the legislature drew up the
districting plan).
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improper ends—“Let the end be legitimate,” as Chief Justice Marshall
put it—and it is the Court’s duty, and the proper function of judicial
review, to maintain this principle. There is substantial reason, furthermore,
to infer that the Justices in the Comstock majority share Justice
Thomas’s uneasiness over simply validating an act of Congress that is
addressed so unabashedly to the “accomplishment” of an object “not
intrusted to the [federal] government.”158 The underlying point of
disagreement between the majority Justices and the dissenters is, on this
reading, a difference over whether § 4248’s non-Article I purpose is so
dominant that the Court should treat the Article I rationale as a
makeweight, unentitled to constitutional force under the pretext aspect of
McCulloch’s reasoning. The convoluted ways in which Justices Breyer,
Kennedy and Alito present their reasoning may then be a product of
their varying attempts to formulate a constitutional standard that explains
their rejection of Justice Thomas’s judgment about how to state the
purpose of § 4248 while indicating their agreement with the dissent that
uses of the Necessary and Proper Clause power that are in fact pretextual
cannot stand.
B. Putting Comstock in Context: The Historical
Debate over Congress’s Ends
Justice Thomas’s adoption of the McCulloch pretext inquiry, and its
arguable echoes in the other opinions, are important for raising an even
more fundamental issue. We cannot identify when Congress is acting
pretextually unless we know what the illegitimate ends are that it might
want to conceal. Turning the inquiry around, what is the universe of
legitimate federal ends that Congress may pursue in using its delegated
powers, including its power under the clause? This is a very old question
indeed in American constitutional history. In the early Republic, it was
most commonly debated either in relation to the issue in McCulloch, the
158. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1983 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see, e.g., id. at 1961
(majority opinion) (“Congress’ power to act as a responsible federal custodian . . . rests
. . . upon federal criminal statutes that legitimately seek to implement constitutionally
enumerated authority.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating
that § 4248 “provid[es] a strong assurance that the proffered reason for the legislation’s
necessity is not a mere artifice”); id. at 1969 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that the
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes federal criminal statutes and the statutory
creation of the concomitant prison system based on the “congressional judgment that, in
order to execute one or more of the powers conferred on Congress, it is necessary and
proper” to enact such laws).
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validity of a national bank, or in discussing the interpretive difficulty
posed by Article I, Section 8’s reference to “the common Defence and
general Welfare.”159 Most early constitutionalists agreed that this latter
phrase specifically related to the scope of Congress’s spending power,
but everyone recognized that there was a more general issue. The
Jeffersonian Republican position was that Congress is necessarily limited to
employing its delegated powers, including its powers under the Spending
and Necessary and Proper Clauses, to achieve those purposes designated
by or inherent in Article I’s expressly enumerated powers. As Jefferson
wrote two years before McCulloch, “our tenet ever was . . . that Congress
had not unlimited powers to provide for the general welfare” and that
“the specification of powers [in Article I] is a limitation of the purposes”
of federal legislation.160 Congress’s legitimate ends are limited by “the
special and careful enumeration of powers” because a Congress empowered
to pursue any end it thought for the common good would possess “a
general power of legislation,” and the Constitution’s enumeration of
powers would be “nugatory and improper.”161 Article I’s list of powers,
159. The first clause of Article I, Section 8 states that “[t]he Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Reading this language to grant Congress a freestanding power to
provide for the common defense and general welfare, as Jefferson and Madison pointed
out in the first national bank debates, “would reduce the whole instrument to a single
phrase, that of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good
of the United States.” Jefferson, supra note 5, at 42; cf. Madison, supra note 5, at 38
(explaining that such an interpretation “would give to Congress an unlimited power [and]
render nugatory the enumeration of particular powers”). Most constitutionalists
therefore construed the phrase to designate the ends for which Congress may tax and
spend and divided between those who agreed with Madison, who thought that
Congress’s fiscal powers were limited to expenditures related to Article I’s enumerated
regulatory powers, and the allies of Hamilton, who insisted that Congress can spend for
any proper governmental purpose without regard to the enumeration of its regulatory
powers. Compare id. (explaining that “the general purposes” for which Congress could
spend “were limited and explained by the particular enumeration subjoined”), with
Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act To Establish a Bank
(Feb. 23, 1791), in LANGUAGES OF POWER, supra note 5, at 43, 49 (explaining that
Congress has “as large a discretion in relation to the application of money as any
legislature whatever,” with the single caveat that Congress “cannot rightfully apply the
money they raise to any purpose merely or purely local”).
160. See Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Albert Gallatin (June 16, 1817), in
LANGUAGES OF POWER, supra note 5, at 314, 314. Jefferson’s specific reference in the
second phrase was to the spending power, but the paragraph as a whole makes it quite
clear that he thought the limitation of congressional purposes by the enumeration of
powers applies to all congressional legislation.
161. James Madison, Message to the U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 3, 1817),
in LANGUAGES OF POWER, supra note 5, at 313, 313–14. Madison brushed aside the
argument that Congress’s ends are unlimited with respect to spending only rather than
with respect to commerce regulation as a difference without substance: such a
“restriction . . . would still leave within the legislative power of Congress all the great
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in other words, states and thereby limits the goals for which Congress
can make laws: Congress has no constitutional authority to legislate “for
purposes which the enumeration did not place under their action.”162
Early nationalists, in contrast, insisted that Article I delegates to Congress a
set of legislative means by which it may pursue the essentially unlimited
end of the “advancement of the public good.”163 The Constitution having
created a government for the purpose of providing for the common
defense and promoting the general welfare, as the Preamble announces,
Congress may use its powers to achieve whatever “promotes the good of
the society, and the ends for which the Government was adopted,” 164 to
the end that “national exigencies are . . . provided for, national
inconveniencies obviated, national prosperity promoted.”165 Nationalists
such as Hamilton routinely conceded that federal legislation had to be
directed toward genuinely national—as opposed to purely local—concerns,
but in the absence of strong sectional conflict, this limitation was more
of theoretical than practical significance.166
Read carefully against the backdrop of the Jeffersonian-nationalist
debate over Congress’s authorized goals, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion
in McCulloch displays a studied ambiguity on the question. The overall
tenor of Chief Justice Marshall’s language is unmistakably nationalistic:
the Constitution delegates to Congress “great powers . . . . vast powers . . . .
on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so
vitally depend” and “[t]he exigencies of the nation” are to be addressed.167
The Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall repeatedly asserted, must be
read to permit “the beneficial exercise of the power”168 it grants
Congress, so “that body [may] perform the high duties assigned to it, in

and most important measures of Government, money being the ordinary and necessary
means of carrying them into execution.” Id. at 314.
162. Jefferson, supra note 160, at 314.
163. Hamilton, supra note 159, at 46–47. Hamilton’s discussion of the scope of
congressional purposes, it should be noted, was more nuanced than that of many other
nationalists.
164. Fisher Ames, Speech in the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 3, 1791), in
LANGUAGES OF POWER, supra note 5, at 40, 41. Ames was Madison’s greatest
intellectual foe in the 1791 House debate over the first bank bill.
165. Hamilton, supra note 159, at 47.
166. See, e.g., id. at 49 (stating that the spending power cannot be employed for
“any purpose merely or purely local”).
167. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407–08 (1819).
168. Id. at 409.
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the manner most beneficial to the people,”169 which sounds very unlike
Jefferson’s or Madison’s insisting that the principle of enumerated
powers entails a rule of enumerated and limited purposes. But these
general propositions strongly suggest a nationalistic predisposition without
expressly rejecting the Jeffersonian rule, and Chief Justice Marshall’s
statement that the Court would strike down acts of Congress passed
“under the pretext of executing its powers [but intended] for the
accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government”170 sits
uneasily with the nationalist argument that Article I “gives to Congress
power over the means, and imposes the duty of providing for the general
welfare in all cases whatever.”171 “Let the end be legitimate,” Chief
Justice Marshall wrote, but he continued with the injunction that Congress’s
purpose must be “within the scope of the constitution.”172 On its face,
the opinion in McCulloch is compatible with the Jeffersonian view of the
scope of Congress’s ends.173
The debate over whether the Article I powers are simply an enumeration
of permitted legislative means or an exclusive list of legitimate
congressional purposes as well did not end with McCulloch. The
familiar twentieth-century history of Commerce Clause and spending
power case law was in large measure a debate between Justices who read
McCulloch as the Court’s imprimatur on Hamiltonian nationalism and
those who insisted that McCulloch’s enduring lesson is that when
Congress’s “purpose” is to address “matters not within any power
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution,” it cannot employ its
enumerated powers as the “means to force compliance” with its

169. Id. at 421.
170. Id. at 423.
171. Alexander Addison, Analysis of the Report of the Committee of the Virginia
Assembly, in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760–1805,
at 1055, 1066 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
172. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
173. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 66 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for “convert[ing] the Necessary and Proper Clause into precisely
what Chief Justice Marshall did not envision, a ‘pretext . . . for the accomplishment of
objects not intrusted to the government’” (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at
423)); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936) (“Whether the end sought to
be attained by an act of Congress is legitimate is wholly a matter of constitutional power
and not at all of legislative discretion. . . . Thus, it may be said that to a constitutional
end many ways are open; but to an end not within the terms of the Constitution, all ways
are closed.” (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421)); Champion v. Ames, 188
U.S. 321, 372, 375 (1903) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s decision
upholding the Federal Lottery Act “as inconsistent with the views of the framers of the
Constitution, and of Marshall, its great expounder,” and quoting “the same great
magistrate in McCulloch v. Maryland” about the Court’s duty to invalidate pretextual
uses of the enumerated powers).
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extraconstitutional goals. 174 The Court lurched between nationalist
decisions such as Champion v. Ames, 175 which upheld a federal
prohibition on the interstate shipment of lottery tickets despite the
obvious fact that Congress’s interest was in public morality rather than
interstate trade, and Jeffersonian outcomes like those in Hammer v.
Dagenhart176 and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,177 holding that Congress
could address the practice of underage labor neither by the regulation of
interstate commerce nor by the imposition of a tax.
But surely that is history. During the New Deal era, the Court
unequivocally adopted the nationalist position. United States v. Butler
announced that it was Hamilton rather than Madison who had correctly
interpreted the scope of the general welfare for which Congress may tax
and spend,178 and for decades the Court has adhered to the view that
“objectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative
fields’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending
power.”179 Darby expressly overruled Hammer and endorsed what the
Court termed “the powerful and now classic dissent of Mr. Justice
Holmes.”180 For Justice Holmes, questions about Congress’s purposes in
passing a law are beside the point constitutionally as long as the
legislation falls within the scope of its powers as a matter of form.181
Congress “may carry out its views of public policy whatever indirect
effect they may have upon the activities of the States. . . . It seems to me
entirely constitutional for Congress to enforce its understanding [of the
national welfare] by all the means at its command.”182 For Justice
Holmes, and for the Court after Darby, or so it has often seemed,
Congress’s powers, enumerated and implied alike, are instruments that

174. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70 (1936).
175. See Champion, 188 U.S. 321.
176. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
177. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
178. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 65–66. Nicely having it both ways, Butler nonetheless
struck down the taxing and spending power legislation before it on the ground that the
federal statute was in effect a regulation of agricultural production and thus a usurpation
of power pointing to “the destruction of local self-government in the states.” Butler, 297
U.S. at 77. That aspect of Butler fell away after Darby.
179. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at
65).
180. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115–17.
181. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
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Congress can employ to implement its views of what is in the public
interest regardless of whether there is a specific connection between
Congress’s public interest goal and the delegated power it uses to
accomplish that goal. Even if McCulloch can be read as a Jeffersonian
opinion, that reading was repudiated long ago, or so one might think.
If the Justices who voted in Comstock to uphold § 4248 had all joined
an opinion reaching that conclusion by what I have termed the obvious
line of argument—one that we might now also call the nationalist
rationale for Comstock—Justice Thomas’s dissent and his attempt to
revitalize the long-dormant pretext inquiry of McCulloch might seem
academic, an almost whimsical gesture toward an untenable position.
From the Holmesian perspective, it would not matter if Congress’s real
purpose in enacting the provision was to impose its preferred policies on
dealing with sexually violent people, as far as possible within the limits
imposed by the enumeration of powers, rather than to create a better
system of dealing with people who transgress the federal statutory norms
governing interstate commerce. Leaving aside the due process and other
individual rights issues not before the Court in Comstock, Congress
having determined to act on “its views of public policy” with respect
to sexual violence, it was “entirely constitutional for Congress to enforce
its understanding [of the national welfare] by all the means at its
command,” including the federal prison system and its custodianship of
violators of federal criminal laws.
As we have seen, however, none of the opinions in Comstock took the
Holmesian nationalist approach. Whether for their own reasons or
because Justice Thomas’s opinion pushed them part of the way toward
his position without bringing them entirely to it, the Justices in the
majority hedged their bets on the scope of congressional authority,
introducing qualifications and suggesting hesitations that leave it unclear
whether any of them fully agree with Justice Holmes. Each of the
opinions in Comstock invoked McCulloch, but in contrast to McCulloch’s
robust affirmation of national legislative competence, they treated the
question of § 4248’s validity in a captious, almost begrudging manner.
The citations are to Chief Justice Marshall, but the tone is more that of
Secretary Jefferson’s bank opinion, with his warning that the Constitution
“was intended to lace [Congress] up straitly within the enumerated
powers.” 183 Comstock is a Jeffersonian McCulloch in which Chief
Justice Marshall’s conviction that Congress’s “power being given, it is
the interest of the nation to facilitate its execution”184 has been partially
subordinated to Jefferson’s insistence that “[t]o take a single step beyond
183.
184.
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the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress is to
take possession of a boundless field of power . . . . to do whatever evil
they please.”185
V. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WITH COMSTOCK
The opinions filed in Comstock are vulnerable to criticism for lapses
in clarity and craftsmanship, but if any objection is to be made for the
Justices’ reopening of the old Jeffersonian-nationalist debate, it must lie
on other grounds. The Jeffersonian theme of suspicion of governmental
power, and above all the power of the national government with its
almost endless capacity to do evil, is an authentically American impulse,
and one with deep roots in our constitutional tradition. Constitutional
issues rooted in the tension between Jeffersonian fear of and nationalist
confidence in federal power go to the very heart of American
constitutional thought. As a consequence, in a certain sense, the
question of how to understand the constitutional scope of Congress’s
ends has no right or wrong answer. Resolving it involves judgment and
requires a choice between answers each of which can lay historical claim
to legitimacy.186 The existence of judgment and choice, on the other
hand, does not render attempts to answer a question of law impossible or
merely an exercise in articulating one’s extralegal preferences. There
are better and worse answers in law, even in constitutional law.
I believe this statement is true even with respect to the very old and quite
basic question of law about the scope of Congress’s purposes that
Comstock has put on the table. The better answer, I further believe, is
that the nationalist rationale for the outcome in Comstock is correct, and

185. Jefferson, supra note 5, at 42.
186. The “inherently elastic, dynamic, and underdetermined” nature of the federal
structure created by the Constitution is a central theme in the recent, brilliant work of
Professor Edward A. Purcell Jr., and from these characteristics he concludes that
“American federalism [is] incapable of either reaching permanent equilibrium or serving
as a determinative constitutional norm.” See EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., ORIGINALISM,
FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY
189, 193 (2007). Purcell’s book is thoroughly persuasive as to its central claims.
However, I do not think that Purcell’s argument that “the Constitution provides no single
and true conception of the federal structure and that all such conceptions are rooted in
complex political, social, and ideological sources,” id. at 201, precludes the attempt to
show that either the nationalist or the Jeffersonian position on Congress’s permissible
ends is more persuasive in terms of our legal and political tradition or of the existing
norms of legal argument.
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the Justices’ varying paths toward reaching or rejecting that outcome,
with their echoes of Jeffersonian thought, are mistaken detours.
A. The Nationalism of American Political Practice
Any constitutional question that finds James Madison and John Marshall
potentially in disagreement is a difficult one. In this conclusion, I can only
sketch out the three chief reasons why I disagree with the Comstock
Justices and the Jeffersonian perspective that they represent with varying
degrees of clarity. First, the arc of American political and constitutional
history, viewed broadly and over time, has moved decisively in the
nationalist direction. My point is not that the extent of federal domestic
legislative activity has continuously increased, although with some
significant exceptions in the late nineteenth century, this is broadly true.
The nationalist constitutional perspective, as I am using the adjective, is
that the Constitution allows Congress to address the indefinite range of
legitimate governmental concerns, not that it should or must do so.
What is most significant legally is that over time, principled opposition
to this view of congressional authority, which was never uniform, has
waned. There is no inconsistency between adhering to a strong
constitutional nationalism, in my sense, while exhibiting a policy-based
skepticism about expansive national regulation: Justice Holmes is a good
example of someone holding both views.
Since the beginning, then, Congress has in fact been treating its
delegated powers as tools for the accomplishment of ends that are not
limited to the terms of the powers themselves, and all three branches of
the federal government have generally treated this as legitimate, and
increasingly so over time. In the early twenty-first century, the American
Republic possesses a national government that regulates a vast array of
domestic concerns without regard to whether the reasons for regulating
them have anything to do with the terms of Article I, Section 8, but this
is no modern innovation. As the great constitutional lawyer Charles
Black once wrote, the modern federal government emerged through “a
process never fully reversed, and but infrequently and then very little
checked since our beginnings.”187 In 1789, for example, the First Congress
enacted a tariff law that had as one of its main goals “the encouragement
and protection of manufactures” and that accordingly provided indirect
federal financial assistance to areas of agriculture and industry that
Congress thought it in the public interest to foster, despite the patent

187. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., On Worrying About the Constitution, in THE HUMANE
IMAGINATION 118, 126 (1986).
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absence of any specific Article I power addressing agriculture or industry.188
The Jeffersonian limitation on Congress’s proper ends was never an
unchallenged orthodoxy and has now long been in abeyance.189 The
result has not been, as Jefferson himself feared, a legally unfettered
Congress, however broad the authority it wields may be190: the
enumerated powers, and the implied powers connected to them through
the Necessary and Proper Clause, remain the tools Congress must use in
carrying out its views of national policy, but the substance of that policy
encompasses any legislative end that is not precluded by the
Constitution’s prohibitions.
The course of political precedent cannot, alone and of its own force,
establish the constitutionality of a political practice it embodies,191 but in
this case we are dealing not with a single governmental action but an
overall course of legislative activity—one often undertaken in the teeth
of constitutional challenge in the legislature and subsequently upheld by
the judiciary. As McCulloch observed,
a doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause, and the human
judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the great principles of liberty
are not concerned, but the respective powers of those who are equally the
representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the practice
of the government, ought to receive a considerable impression from that
practice.192

What Chief Justice Marshall thought a powerful consideration with
respect to the particular question of the national bank must be even
weightier in evaluating the legitimacy of the nationalist answer to the
question of which ends are legitimate ones for Congress to pursue. Chief
188. Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24, 24 (repealed 1790); see DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 56–60 (1997)
(discussing the absence of any suggestion that Congress could not “impose tariffs in
order to stimulate domestic production” and the widespread assumption that “it [was]
appropriate to use the tax power itself for the promotion of goals unrelated to revenue”).
189. See PURCELL, supra note 186, at 153 (explaining that the Court “expanded federal
executive power” and “extended the powers of Congress dramatically” in the 1930s).
190. See Jefferson, supra note 5, at 42 (“[I]nstituting a Congress with power to do
whatever would be for the good of the United States . . . would be also a power to do
whatever evil they please.”).
191. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1958 (2010) (“[N]o one
acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970))); id. at
1979 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he antiquity of a practice [cannot] serve as a
substitute for its constitutionality . . . .”).
192. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
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Justice Marshall’s ancillary point that in 1819 there were substantial,
reasonable reliance interests that would have been thwarted if the national
bank were invalidated is also relevant and indeed of immeasurably
greater practical import in deciding whether the Jeffersonian view of
congressional ends ought to be allowed to put into question the modern
national regulatory state.193 Given the founding-era disagreements, I think
it impossible to deny, fairly, that the debate over Congress’s legitimate
ends is “a doubtful question, one on which human reason may pause,
and the human judgment be suspended.” That being so, the political
history seems almost conclusive, especially in light of the principle, long
recognized by the Supreme Court, that “in determining . . . the existence
of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself—even when the
validity of the practice is the subject of investigation.”194
B. The Supreme Court’s Adherence to the Nationalist Position
Second, it is the nationalist position, not the Jeffersonian one, that
makes better overall sense of the history of judicial interpretation of
Congress’s powers.195 As we have seen, the first part of the twentieth
century saw the Supreme Court swing back and forth on several occasions
between the two perspectives, and only then, between 1936 and 1941,
endorse the nationalist position decisively and, at least before Comstock,
with impressive consistency.196 Before and even during the seesaw
period, however, as Justice Holmes sarcastically noted in dissenting
from the Jeffersonian decision in Hammer, the Court’s default position
was in fact the nationalist one.197 Congress, the Court concluded long
before the New Deal, has the constitutional authority to use its enumerated

193. Id. (“An exposition of the constitution, deliberately established by legislative
acts, on the faith of which an immense property has been advanced, ought not to be
lightly disregarded.”).
194. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 473 (1915). As the Court
there observed, the Supreme Court first applied this principle in one of the Marshall
Court’s earliest constitutional decisions, Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 298 (1803),
which upheld the constitutionality of Congress’s repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801.
Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. at 473.
195. See PURCELL, supra note 186, at 153 (summarizing the Court’s role in
expanding national authority).
196. See supra notes 174–84 and accompanying text.
197. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 278 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“I should have thought that that matter had been disposed of so fully as to leave no
room for doubt. I should have thought that the most conspicuous decisions of this Court
had made it clear that the power to regulate commerce and other constitutional powers
could not be cut down or qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the carrying out
of the domestic policy of any State.”). Justice Holmes’s subsequent discussion of the
many roughly contemporaneous decisions rejecting the Jeffersonian position was
succinct but, I believe, unanswerable. See id. at 278–81.
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powers “to promote the general welfare, material and moral. . . . [by
addressing] the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene
literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of
food and drugs, [and] the systematic enticement to . . . prostitution and
debauchery of women”;198 to employ the taxing power “to protect the
consumer” with regulations “caring for the health or safety of citizens or
others who buy articles” of commerce;199 to enact postal regulations to
protect “the public morals” and in doing so “exercise [its own]
sound discretion” as to what is “criminal or immoral”;200 “to enhance the
respect and love of the citizen for the institutions of his country” by
erecting monuments and managing battlefields to provide “a great object
lesson to all [and] show a proper recognition of the great things that
were done there”;201 to implement a treaty for the purpose of preventing
damage to “a food supply” and to “the [natural] protectors of our forests
and our crops”;202 and to preclude inequitable legal decisions, poverty on
the part of those who have served the nation, the evils of alcoholic
beverages, and inflation and housing shortages, where any of these were
the consequences of war.203 The war power decisions are of particular

198. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913).
199. Felsenheld v. United States, 186 U.S. 126, 131, 132 (1902).
200. In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 132, 134 (1892).
201. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 681, 682 (1896).
The provision comes within the rule laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland, in these words: ‘Let the end be legitimate’ . . . .
. . . Such a [law] seems . . . so closely connected with the welfare of the
republic itself as to be within the powers granted Congress by the Constitution
for the purpose of protecting and preserving the whole country.
Id. at 681–82 (citation omitted) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 421 (1819)).
202. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
203. See Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 507 (1870) (upholding a Civil
War era act of Congress suspending statutes of limitations in state courts during the
period the war prevented prosecution of civil actions because Congress’s use of the “war
power” to “promote[] justice and honesty” is “within the canons of construction laid
down by Chief Justice Marshall” in McCulloch); United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 351
(1878) (stating that Congress may grant pensions to those “wounded, disabled, or
otherwise rendered invalids while in the public service, even in cases where no prior
promise was made or antecedent inducement held out”); Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries &
Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 155–56 (1919) (upholding a wartime prohibition law,
including its continuance during the period following the end of hostilities, even after
conceding that Congress lacks the police power authority to set alcohol policy); Fleming
v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947) (stating that the war
power “is plainly adequate to deal with problems of law enforcement which arise
during the period of hostilities but do not cease with them” and upholding enforcement
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relevance to Comstock in that they consistently upheld the
legitimacy of Congress’s using the “implied war powers” to address a
perceived social problem even after the end of the circumstance—military
hostilities—that gave rise to Congress’s authority to use the powers in the
first place.204
In some of these cases, with sufficient ingenuity, it is possible to
shoehorn Congress’s clearly extra-Article I goals into the ends apparent
on the face of one or the other of its enumerated powers, but taken as a
whole, the decisions only make sense on the assumption that the
legitimacy of Congress’s purposes in enacting legislation is not limited
by the terms of Article I, including the Necessary and Proper Clause,
even though the means it rightly may use are. The great majority of the
Court’s comments on the scope of Congress’s legitimate purposes, even
before the Court formally rejected the Jeffersonian position during the
New Deal, came to the nationalist conclusion that an “act [of Congress]
may not be declared unconstitutional because its effect may be to
accomplish another purpose as well as” that implicit in the language of
the enumerated power Congress is carrying into execution.205 Justice
Thomas’s suggestion that § 4248 is unconstitutional because Congress
clearly wished to address sexual violence—a goal he rightly identifies as
within the states’ police power206—and that the provision pursues that
intention by using the tool of civil commitment—an exercise of the
police power when undertaken by a state—is flatly contrary to the
Court’s longstanding and repeated insistence that
when the United States exerts any of the powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution, no valid objection can be based upon the fact that such exercise
may be attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise by a State of
its police power, or that it may tend to accomplish a similar purpose.207

The Court has also repeatedly insisted that it is constitutionally
immaterial that “ends other than [the purpose related to the enumerated
provisions of a price control act); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141
(1948) (upholding a rent control law enacted after the end of hostilities because
Congress’s “war power does not necessarily end with the cessation of hostilities”).
204. Hamilton, 251 U.S. at 155. The parallel to Comstock is clear: the constitutional
concern over § 4248 is in part that the provision employs implied powers—to enact
criminal laws and create a federal prison system—in order to exercise federal legislative
jurisdiction over a federal prisoner “even after the Government loses the authority to
prosecute him for a federal crime.” United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1978
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
205. United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94 (1919).
206. See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1982 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Absent
congressional action that is in accordance with, or necessary and proper to, an
enumerated power, the duty to protect citizens from violent crime, including acts of
sexual violence, belongs solely to the States.”).
207. Hamilton, 251 U.S. at 156.
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power being executed] will also be served, or [even that the enumeratedpower end] may be relatively of lesser importance.”208 The old Jeffersonian
decisions such as Hammer, to the contrary, do support Justice Thomas’s
argument, but they were aberrational when they were decided and now,
of course, are altogether discredited—unless Comstock has set that in
question.209
But what about McCulloch, which the Comstock opinions agreed is
the wellspring of sound judicial reasoning about the Necessary and
Proper Clause? As we saw above, the text of Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion is not logically inconsistent with a Jeffersonian understanding of
the ends of Congress, and his announcement that the Court would strike
down pretextual use of Congress’s powers “for the accomplishment of
objects not intrusted to the government” fits comfortably within the
Jeffersonian model. The tone of Chief Justice Marshall’s language,
however, seems unmistakably hostile to the enterprise of cutting down
the reach of Congress’s authority through technical verbal arguments or
judicial reevaluations of Congress’s judgments. We have, furthermore,
an interpretation of McCulloch’s implications for the Jeffersoniannationalist dispute over the scope of Congress’s constitutional ends
written by Chief Justice Marshall himself, in a newspaper essay that he
published in the summer of 1819 under a nom de plume. Echoing his
assertion in McCulloch that “we must never forget, that it is a
constitution we are expounding,”210 Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
The object of the instrument is not a single one which can be minutely
described, with all its circumstances [but] . . . . a general system for all future
times, to be adapted by those who administer it, to all future occasions that may
come within its own view. From its nature, such an instrument can describe
only the great objects it is intended to accomplish, and state in general terms,
the specific powers which are deemed necessary for those objects. To direct the
manner in which these powers are to be exercised, the means by which the
objects of the government are to be effected, a legislature is granted.211

208. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941).
209. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Referring specifically to
Hammer, Professor Black noted that “[n]o ancient ramparts were being manned here.
The ancient ramparts were and are imaginary.” BLACK, supra note 187, at 126.
210. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
211. John Marshall, “A Friend of the Constitution” Essay No. III, ALEXANDRIA
GAZETTE, July 2, 1819 (signing his essay originally under the name A Friend of the
Constitution), reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND,
supra note 122, at 167, 170–71.
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In this passage, Chief Justice Marshall clearly distinguished “the great
objects” that the Constitution “describe[s]” as the goals of the federal
government it creates from “the specific powers which are deemed
necessary for those objects” and those powers in turn from “the means”
Congress is empowered to select in order to effect “the objects of the
government.” The “specific powers” must be the powers enumerated in
Article I, and “the means” obviously are the actual legislative choices
Congress may make pursuant to the enumerated powers and the
Necessary and Proper Clause so that the Constitution’s “principles [may]
be applied to particulars.”212 The constitutional description of the great
objects of the federal government, which Chief Justice Marshall’s syntax
clearly distinguishes from its specification of federal powers, can only
be the Preamble or the reference in Article I, Section 8 to “provid[ing]
for the common Defence and general Welfare”213 if it is not the entirely
indefinite range of legitimate legislative objectives open to the legislature in
a republic.214 Whatever we are to make of the pretext passage in
McCulloch,215 Chief Justice Marshall clearly did not think that Congress,
or the Court, is supposed to determine the legitimacy of Congress’s ends
by the sort of textual exegesis the Jeffersonians required.216 I would
count McCulloch, too, in the long list of judicial opinions acting on the
nationalist view of Congress’s legitimate ends.

212. See id.
213. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
214. The differences between these three possibilities are purely semantic. As
Madison had observed two years earlier, “the terms ‘common defense and general
welfare’ embrac[e] every object and act within the purview of a legislative trust.”
Madison, supra note 161, at 313. This interpretation of Chief Justice Marshall’s views is
confirmed by his opinion in Cohens v. Virginia, where he carefully distinguished the
“ample powers” the people “confided” in the “supreme government” from “the great
purposes for which they were so confided,” which Marshall explained by quoting the
Preamble. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 381 (1821). Immediately
thereafter, Marshall again drew a distinction between the government’s “ample powers”
and “these interesting purposes.” Id. at 382.
215. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423 (“Should Congress, in the execution of
its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress,
under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects
not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal,
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the
law of the land.”).
216. Chief Justice Marshall’s essay gave as an example of a federal law enacted
“fraudulently . . . to the destruction of the fair land marks of the constitution” an act of
Congress “alter[ing] the law of descents” as a supposed exercise of the taxing power or
of the Article IV duty to guarantee a republican form of government. He did not explain
how the Court would recognize that Congress was acting fraudulently. Marshall, supra
note 211, at 173.
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C. The Proper Role of Judicial Review
James Madison’s chief objection to the opinion of the Court in
McCulloch was that he feared that in practice its reasoning would “break
down the landmarks intended by a specification of the Powers of
Congress,” and in particular that it would “relinquish . . . all [judicial]
controul on the Legislative exercise of unconstitutional powers.”217
“[S]uppose Congress should, as would doubtless happen, pass
unconstitutional laws . . . as means expedient, convenient or conducive
to the accomplishment of objects entrusted to the Government; by what
handle could the Court take hold of the case?”218 Madison’s worry
seems to me unanswerable, in the terms he framed it, and as a
consequence I do not think that the pretext inquiry Chief Justice
Marshall posited in McCulloch, and that Justice Thomas applied in
Comstock, is workable without a judicial revolution that would fly in the
face of the considerations of political practice and longstanding Court
precedent discussed above. It does not follow, however, that we must
accept the inevitable “exclu[sion of] the judicial authority of the United
States from its participation in guarding the boundary” of congressional
power that Madison wanted to avert.219
The fundamental role of judicial review in the American system is not
to hold the balance between national and state power, or to serve as the
tribune of the people against congressional tyranny; it is to uphold the
rule of law by determining, in cases where the issue is properly
presented, whether federal legislation executes one of the enumerated
powers, either directly or through the mediation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause. The Court fully executes that enumerated Article III
power and duty when it applies whatever the relevant constitutional
doctrine may be: a unanimous opinion in Comstock that § 4248 is
constitutional on the basis of what I have called the obvious rationale
would have upheld the rule of law just as thoroughly as an opinion
invalidating it on cogent grounds—far more so, of course, if my legal
argument in defense of the provision is persuasive—and either would
have upheld the rule of law more clearly than the muddled opinions that

217. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in THE MIND OF
FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 359, 359–60
(Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981).
218. Id. at 360.
219. Madison, supra note 161, at 313.
THE
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were actually filed in the case. Judicial review directed at ensuring that
federal legislation meets the legal test of derivation from the enumerated
powers is both possible under the nationalist view and necessary to
maintain its legitimacy.
It is true that modern constitutional doctrine, far more often than not,
leads to a decision in favor of Congress’s legislative authority, but that is
troubling only on the assumption that we ought to read the Constitution
to limit the Republic to a significantly weaker national government than
the Republic’s political processes have created over time. In an unduly
neglected paragraph in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall affirmed that
“a bold and daring usurpation [of illegitimate legislative power] might
be resisted, after an acquiescence still longer and more complete than
this,” and he qualified the precedential force of practice by limiting it to
questions “in the decision of which the great principles of liberty are not
concerned.”220 But it is difficult to see as a usurpation a view of national
power that has repeatedly been endorsed “by every authority that could
conceivably be thought competent”—the two houses of Congress, the
President, the Supreme Court, the electorate—under conditions of political
freedom that have generally only become more robust because of the
exercise of national authority.221 Unlike the Jeffersonian constitutional
view, which would require the judicial imposition of decentralizing
results on the country, the nationalist view is permissive, recognizing
Congress’s legislative prerogative to come to politically Jeffersonian as
well as more centralizing practical outcomes. The political process is
perfectly capable, if there is the political will so to use it, of reversing the
historical growth of national power and reducing the reach and
responsibilities of the federal government.
There is no sound justification, in contrast, for seeing such a reduction
of federal responsibility as the duty of the judiciary, and there are serious
reasons to doubt that it is within the rightful power of the courts.
McCulloch was a case about the proper scope of Article III and not
merely Article I, and Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion embodies his deep
concern that judicial review must not lead the Supreme Court inadvertently
“to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department and to tread
on legislative ground.”222 The Jeffersonian concern that the modern federal
government has become a clumsy as well as an oppressive Leviathan
that must be restrained may well be right, but addressing it in any
effective manner—short of a wholesale repudiation of the last century
and a half of federal legislation—would require the exercise of legislative
220.
221.
222.
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judgment. If Jeffersonian “strict construction” of congressional power
was ever a feasible rule for courts to apply—a view Chief Justice
Marshall emphatically rejected—it is no longer. And in any event, we
need not abandon Jefferson’s basic constitutional concern with freedom
when we recognize that it is impossible to repristinate his views on the
legal scope of national authority. “[I]t is not allowable to assume as a
postulate,” Chief Justice Marshall wrote in defense of McCulloch, “that
the cause of liberty must be promoted by deciding the question [of
congressional power] against the government of the union.”223 The
American experience has often been that freedom is better guarded by
national rather than local power; as a practical matter, Chief Justice
Marshall’s nationalism has proven the ally of the cause of liberty for
which Jefferson spoke so eloquently.
VI. CONCLUSION: COMSTOCK AND THE FEAR OF POWER
The Necessary and Proper Clause is, as Chief Justice John Marshall
and James Madison agreed, essentially redundant: by necessary implication
Congress’s legitimate powers would be just as broad if the clause were
not part of the constitutional text.224 For that very reason, questions
involving the interpretation of the clause unavoidably present the issue
of how we are to understand more generally the scope of legislative
power under the Constitution. The better interpretation of the Constitution
is that any legislative end is legitimate for Congress to pursue if it is
legitimate for any American legislative body to address. This is broad
power indeed, and in this respect—though not of course with regard to
the definition of Congress’s enumerated-power tools or the Constitution’s
prohibitions—it is beyond the judiciary’s competence to delimit. Justice
Holmes once wrote that “[w]e fear to grant power and are unwilling to
recognize it when it exists.”225 The opinions in Comstock, and not just
the dissent, reveal a Court frightened of democratic power and deeply
223. John Marshall, “A Friend of the Constitution” Essay No. I, ALEXANDRIA
GAZETTE, June 30, 1819 (signing his essay originally under the name A Friend of the
Constitution), reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND,
supra note 122, at 155, 159.
224. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 420 (stating that the clause “does not
enlarge [or] restrain” Congress’s powers); Madison, supra note 5, at 38 (stating that the
clause “is in fact merely declaratory of what would have resulted by unavoidable
implication”).
225. Tyson & Bro. United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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reluctant to acknowledge that on some issues, the law of the Constitution
requires judges to recognize the exercise of a congressional power that
the judges may not second-guess. The Necessary and Proper Clause, as
Chief Justice Marshall wrote, does not undercut the principle that “the
powers of the government are limited,” but neither does it “impair the
right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of
measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the
government.”226 The courts have no proper role in determining which
otherwise legitimate governmental concerns Congress should address.
This is not a new issue in American constitutional law. In one of the
Supreme Court’s first important decisions, Calder v. Bull, Justice James
Iredell conceded that when the Court declines to recognize the existence
of a proposed constitutional constraint on legislative power, it necessarily
allows for the possibility that the legislature will abuse its power in ways
that inferring the constraint might have prevented.227 But the Constitution
does not ordain every constraint that some might think advisable, and
some constraints on the legislature would deny it powers without which
“the operations of Government would often be obstructed, and society
itself would be endangered.”228 In such situations,
[i]t is not sufficient to urge, that the power may be abused, for, such is the
nature of all power, such is the tendency of every human institution . . . . We
must be content to limit power where we can, and where we cannot,
consistently with its use, we must be content to repose a salutary confidence.229

“[T]he public policy of the United States . . . is for Congress to express”230
and extends to “every object . . . within the purview of a legislative
trust.” 231 Congress surely can abuse the power that this principle
recognizes, but if it does, the remedy is, or ought to be, political. To the
extent that the Court’s treatment of Comstock has obscured that truth
about our system, the case—though not the Necessary and Proper
Clause—is truly regrettable.

226. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 420–21.
227. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (opinion of Iredell, J.).
228. Id. at 400.
229. Id. The issue before the Court was the applicability of the Ex Post Facto
Clause of Article I, Section 10 to state civil legislation, but Justice Iredell was expressly
addressing the interpretation of Article I, Section 9’s parallel clause, which applies to
Congress, as well in the quoted discussion.
230. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
231. Madison, supra note 161, at 313.
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